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Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find that managers shielded from the threat of
takeovers exert less effort to maximize firm value, consistent with a 'quiet life'
hypothesis. I study whether the governance role of financial reporting can mitigate
adverse effects arising from managerial preferences for a quiet life. I hypothesize and
find evidence that after changes in the mid 1990's to Delaware's takeover protection
regime, Delaware firms with higher financial reporting quality (FRQ) have better
operating performance and higher capital investment intensity. Furthermore, the above
relation between FRQ and performance is stronger for firms operating in less competitive
industries, and firms with staggered boards. Overall, the results suggest that financial
reporting can help mitigate adverse effects associated with managerial preferences for a
quiet life.
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1. Introduction
I hypothesize that financial reporting functioning as a governance mechanism can
help mitigate agency costs associated with managerial preferences for a quiet life. Financial
reporting provides a firm's owners and other monitors (e.g. boards of directors, debt holders,
and analysts) with verifiable information that can be used as a direct input to evaluate firm
performance. Higher quality financial reporting allows more effective monitoring and
contracting by a firm's stakeholders, reducing moral hazard, shirking and wealth
expropriation activities by management (e.g. Bushman and Smith, 2001; Watts 2003a).
Thus, when firms obtain protection from the threat of hostile takeovers (i.e., when the
potential for moral hazard increases), financial reporting can serve an amplified monitoring
role to curb managerial value-decreasing actions associated with quiet life preferences.
I exploit a change in Delaware's takeover protection regime in the mid-1990s that
greatly increased the ability of firms to resist hostile takeovers. In response to legal battles
associated with a series of takeover contests, the Delaware Supreme Court legitimized the
use of a poison pill-staggered board combination, rendering Delaware firms with staggered
boards virtually immune to hostile takeovers and decreasing the effectiveness of the market
for corporate control as a governance mechanism (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Rauh, 2006; Low,
2008). This setting thus provides an exogenous shock to managerial incentives to engage in
'quiet life' behavior that I use to test the governance role of financial reporting. A unique
feature of the Delaware regime shift setting is that only firms incorporated in Delaware are
affected by the regime shift, regardless of their state of location, which allows me to use
non-Delaware firms as a control group.
I use measures of accounting conservatism to capture the quality of a firm's financial
reporting. Conservatism can reduce agency costs arising from information asymmetry
between managers and stockholders by enhancing the corporate governance of a firm and by
increasing the quality of information available to stockholders (Watts, 2003a). Conservatism
is particularly suited to mitigate agency problems arising from managerial incentives to
engage in quiet life behavior because greater conservatism speeds the recognition of bad
news, which in turn facilitates the monitoring and disciplining of managerial actions. I use
firm-specific measures from Khan and Watts (2008) - CScore and BScore - to proxy for
conservatism.
I use a differences-in-differences methodology to exploit variation in the effects of
the regime shift. First, I identify a sample of firms that are incorporated in Delaware and
hence, affected by the regime shift (treatment firms). I also identify two sets of control firms
that are unlikely to experience changes in their incentives to engage in quiet life behavior.
First, I use Delaware firms in the pre-regime shift period as a control group. An advantage
of using this control group is that is that they are likely to be similar to the post-regime shift
Delaware firm sample along many dimensions. Second, I use a sample of firms that are
incorporated in states other than Delaware (Non-Delaware firms). An advantage of this
control group is that it allows me to control for the effects of macro-economic shocks and/or
other inter-temporal variations that occur contemporaneous to the regime shift. The
differences-in-differences methodology has been widely used in recent studies that examine
changes in takeover protection regimes (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Rauh, 2006;
Giroud and Mueller, 2008; Low, 2008) as well as in the labor and financial economics
literatures.
I test the hypothesis that greater financial reporting quality after the regime shift
dampens managerial quiet life behavior and improves performance by examining
differences in operating performance for the treatment and control firms. I also conduct
similar tests to examine the effect of financial reporting quality on differences in capital
investment and disposal activity for the treatment and control firms. I note that all empirical
tests include controls for firm specific determinants of performance, capital investment and
disposals, as well as controls for governance mechanisms.
My empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that higher financial
reporting quality dampens the adverse effects of managerial preferences for a quiet life. I
find evidence of a positive and significant relation between conservatism and operating
performance after the regime shift for Delaware firms, and the relation is significantly
different from the change for non-Delaware firms. Specifically, following the regime shift
and relative to non-Delaware firms, Delaware firms on average report an 8.7% decrease in
operating performance. This result is concentrated in firms with low financial reporting
quality - a one standard deviation increase in accounting conservatism is associated with a
17-20% increase in operating performance for Delaware firms post-regime shift. This
evidence is consistent with financial reporting conservatism dampening the performance
related effects of managerial quiet life behavior.
I also find evidence of a positive relation between capital investment and FRQ in the
post-regime shift period. This is consistent with financial reporting playing a governance
role that influences managerial real actions. First, I find that the average Delaware firm in
my sample has a statistically insignificant change in investment around the regime shift.
This is consistent with Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) who argue that such evidence
supports managerial preferences for a quiet life - i.e. managers maintain the status quo and
do not undertake effort to change existing practices. I then examine the post-regime shift
effect of FRQ for Delaware firms. Results suggest that when compared to non-Delaware
firms, the association between capital investment and FRQ is positive and significant in the
post-regime shift period. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in FRQ for
Delaware firms in the post-period is linked to an increase in capital investment of
approximately 7%, relative to the pre-regime shift period. This result suggests that greater
financial reporting quality can limit underinvestment arising from managerial preferences to
engage in quiet life behavior.
I also examine the effect of FRQ on asset disposal activity around the regime shift.
Quiet life preferences should result in decreased disposal activity in the post regime shift
period. Financial reporting conservatism should speed the recognition of bad news arising
from the retention of negative NPV assets in the post period, providing stakeholders with a
timelier signal of the adverse outcomes of quiet life behavior. The empirical evidence does
not provide strong support for the argument that financial reporting plays a magnified role in
influencing asset disposal activity for Delaware firms in the post period.
In addition to the tests above, I identify two variables that proxy for the severity of
the governance problem and predict that the effect of financial reporting on managerial
behavior will be stronger when the potential for quiet life behavior is higher. First, I argue
that the role of financial reporting in mitigating quiet life behavior is decreasing in market
competition. Firms facing less competition have greater incentives to engage in quiet life
behavior because they face less pressure to reduce slack and improve efficiency relative to
firms operating in competitive environments (Giroud and Mueller, 2008). Second, I predict
and find that the post-regime shift role of financial reporting in mitigating quiet life behavior
is only present for Delaware firms with relatively stronger takeover defenses. Managers of
firms with stronger takeover defenses have greater incentives to engage in quiet life
behavior relative to firms with weaker takeover defenses - the latter continue to be subject to
disciplinary pressure from the market for corporate control post-regime shift.
Empirical findings are robust to the inclusion of controls for determinants of
operating performance and capital investment, controls for alternative governance
mechanisms, different subsamples, time periods, alternative econometric specifications and
numerous other robustness and sensitivity tests. Overall, my results provide support for the
argument that when the effectiveness of the market for corporate control diminishes, the
governance role of financial reporting quality is magnified, mitigating the ability of
managers to engage in behavior consistent with their preferences for a quiet life.
This paper contributes to two streams of literature. First, I contribute to a literature
that examines the governance and monitoring role of financial reporting with respect to
investment decisions (e.g., Bens and Monahan, 2004; Bushman et al., 2006; Biddle et al.,
2009; Hope and Thomas, 2008; Beatty, Liao and Weber, 2009). Much of this literature
examines a cross-sectional association between financial reporting and investment decisions,
and finds that higher financial reporting quality is positively related to investment efficiency.
The main challenge to this literature, however, is to identify an exogenous shock that
changes managerial incentives to engage in non-value maximizing investment activities. By
using changes in Delaware's takeover protection regime, I am able to address this limitation,
and present results that are more consistent with a causal link between reporting quality and
investment efficiency. Furthermore, the use of non-Delaware firms as a control group allows
me to control for unobservable market-wide events.
Second, I contribute to research that examines the effects of changes in takeover
protection. Extant work examines managerial behavior around changes in takeover
protection regimes (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999a,b, 2003; Cheng et al. 2004;
Rauh, 2006; and Low, 2008), and stock market reactions to changes in takeover protection
regimes (Hackl and Testani, 1988; Szewczyk and Tsetsekos, 1992). This literature, however,
has not investigated whether the firm's financial reporting system can mitigate the adverse
effects of changes in the market for corporate control. By examining whether financial
reporting quality mitigates quiet life behavior, I provide evidence about cross-sectional
differences in the effects of changes in takeover protection regimes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the
market for corporate control, and events pertinent to the Delaware takeover regime shift.
Section 3 outlines the hypotheses. In Section 4, I describe the data and in Section 5, I
explain the methodology used in this study. Section 6 presents empirical results and Section
7 concludes.
2. The Market for Corporate Control and Delaware's mid-1990s regime shift
2.1 The Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control is generally viewed as a corporate governance
mechanism and is defined as "the arena in which alternative management teams compete for
the right to manage corporate resources" (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). An active market for
corporate control reduces stockholder-manager conflict, and along with the internal controls
of a firm, is viewed as one of the most important mechanisms that discipline managerial
behavior (Jensen, 1993). The threat of a takeover disciplines managerial behavior because
changes in corporate control are often followed by changes in management - the new
owners replace incumbent managers with their own management teams. Accordingly,
incumbent managers are incentivized to reduce the risk of job loss, and accordingly, take
actions that maximize stockholder value.
While an active market for corporate control can reduce stockholder-manager
conflicts, there are also potential costs. The threat of takeovers may induce managers to take
actions that maximize short-run performance in order to meet market expectations. Such
actions may not create long-run firm value. On the other hand, limiting the threat of
takeovers reduces the risk that managers focus on short-run performance. Linn and
McConnell (1983) note that proponents of anti-takeover provisions argue that protection
from takeovers provide two salutary effects. First, it strengthens the hand of incumbent
managers in dealing with acquirers whose primary objective is to obtain the target's assets at
an unreasonably low price. Second, continuity in management allows greater stability in the
firm's long-term focus on profitability and firm value.
Both firm and macro-level factors affect the effectiveness of the governance role of
the market for corporate control. Firms can implement anti-takeover provisions that limit a
bidder's ability to obtain control of the target and/or decrease the attractiveness of the target
to potential acquirers.1 Changes in legislation can also severely restrict the market for
corporate control. For example, changes in Business Combination laws in 30 states between
the late 1980s and mid 1990s impose a moratorium on specific transactions between the
target and a raider holding a specified threshold percentage of stock unless the board votes
otherwise before the acquiring person becomes and interested stockholder (Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2003). Prohibited transactions include the sale of assets, mergers, and
business relationships.
Another related mechanism that affects the effectiveness of the market for corporate
control is a change in the judicial interpretation of existing legislation. One example is the
1995 Delaware regime shift, a setting that I exploit in this study and discuss below. It is
important to note that there is a subtle but important difference between a change in judicial
interpretation of existing laws (such as the Delaware regime shift) and a change in
legislation (such as the change in business combination laws in the mid 1980s).
2.2 Delaware's mid-1990's Takeover Regime Shift
Changes in Delaware's takeover legal protection in the mid-1990s validated the use
of a staggered board-poison pill combination to repel hostile takeovers. The combination
gave Delaware firms an extremely potent takeover defense and made them virtually immune
to hostile takeovers (e.g. Subramanian, 2004; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Rauh, 2006).
An important point to emphasize is that these takeover defense mechanisms are geared towards repelling unsolicited
takeover bids. In other words, targets can elect to retract takeover defenses if the takeover is deemed to be friendly or is
solicited.
Furthermore, prior studies argue that the dynamics of modern takeover battles have rendered
all other defenses superfluous (Daines and Klausner, 2001; Coates, 2000).
Prior to the regime shift, Delaware legal precedent restricted the ability of Delaware
firms to use poison pills. For example, in City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc (1988) the
Chancery Court of Delaware 2 ordered the target (Interco) to retract its poison pill and allow
shareholders to decide whether or not to accept the acquirer's hostile bid. In such cases, a
staggered board-poison pill defense is reduced to a staggered board defense, which, without
a poison pill, is not considered to provide strong protection from hostile bids (Bebchuk et
al., 2002).
Research examining changes in takeover protection regimes (e.g. Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2008) has typically focused on the changes in BC
laws in the mid 198 Os. Recent work has begun to focus on the mid-i 990s Delaware takeover
regime shift. The Delaware regime shift setting offers some advantages over the BC laws
setting. First, the Delaware regime shift could be considered to be relatively more exogenous
vis-a-vie the BC laws regime shift because the former occurs as the result of a change in the
judicial interpretation of existing laws, whereas the latter occurs because of a change in
legislation. The endogeneity concern that arises with studies using the BC laws regime shift
setting is that firms expecting to have weak future performance lobby local politicians to
increase takeover protection. The exogeneity of the Delaware regime shift relies on the
belief that changes in judicial interpretation of existing laws are less subject to such
endogenous pressures.
2 The Delaware Court of Chancery is a court of equity, and is one of Delaware's three constitutional courts along with the
Supreme Court and the Superior Court.
Second, data availability around the Delaware regime shift is relatively greater than
for the BC laws regime shift. This permits researchers to use a relatively more pertinent set
of controls that sharpen the interpretability of empirical tests. In the next section I discuss
the takeover defense mechanisms that are central to the Delaware regime shift.
2.3 Takeover defense mechanisms
In this section, I consider the two takeover defense mechanisms that are the
foundation for the Delaware regime shift: Poison Pills and Staggered Boards. Gompers et
al., (2003) identify these mechanisms as two of the most powerful anti-takeover defense
mechanisms available to companies in current times.
2.3.1 Poison pills
Poison pills (also known as a shareholder rights plan) are a form of takeover defense
mechanism that acts to dilute an acquirer's share in a target. They consist of stock warrants
or rights that allow the holder to buy an acquirer's stock or the target's stock, or both, at a
substantial discount from the market price (Bebchuk et al., 2002). The rights become
exercisable in the event that any stockholder of the target firm acquires greater than some
pre-specified percentage of the target's stock without the approval of the target's board of
directors, and are issued to all stockholders of the target firm with the exception of the
stockholder who's holdings triggered the pill.
A commonly observed variant of a poison pill is a "Flip Over" Rights Plan (Bebchuk
et al., 2002).3 Under this plan, the target firm common stockholders are given the right to
buy non-voting stock in the target. The rights are not independently tradable because they
are linked to the common stock. The rights are worthless at the time of issue as the exercise
3 Other types of poison pills include "Flip In" Rights Plans and "Poison Debt" Rights Plans. While these pills are somewhat
different to "Flip Over" rights plans in their implementation, the objective of all variants of poison pills remains similar:
Make a bidder's attempted acquisition of a target prohibitively costly.
price is set at a significantly higher level than the prevailing stock price. If a hostile bid is
successful, the rights to purchase shares at a significant discount (up to 50%) of the
prevailing market price can be exercised by all holders except the bidder. This significantly
dilutes the acquirer's holdings and can make it prohibitively expensive to continue the
attempted takeover. If the bid is abandoned, the target retains the option to redeem the rights
for a nominal amount.
Poison pills provide a very effective defense against hostile takeovers. Bebchuk et al.
(2003) note "as long as the pill remains in place, no other defensive measures are necessary
because [a] bid is completely blocked". A poison pill has one main weakness: it can be
redeemed at any time by the target's board. Hence, if an acquirer is able to win a proxy
contest and obtain control of a target's board, the pill is virtually useless because it can be
redeemed. Hence, it is critical for a target to ensure is that the pill itself is protected. One
method may be to limit the speed with which an acquirer can obtain control of a target
board, for instance with the use of a staggered board to limit the number of directors that can
be replaced if a proxy context is lost. I discuss staggered boards in more detail next.
2.3.2 Staggered boards
Staggered boards are boards of directors in which directors are grouped into classes
(typically three) and the classes are elected during successive annual meetings. In order to
obtain control of the board, potential acquirers would have to win multiple proxy contests in
order to obtain control of the target board. Such actions could take up to two years, which
can be a prohibitively long delay (Low, 2009). Furthermore, the delay to obtain control of
the board provides the target with time to implement or undertake other measures that can
make the target less attractive. In contrast, 'un-staggered' boards require all directors to be
elected annually, which permits a bidder to obtain control of a board in a single proxy
contest.
Proponents of staggered boards propose two nontakeover-related justifications for
the use of staggered boards (Bebchuk et al., 2003). First, staggered boards facilitate the
independence of outside directors. Under this argument, independent directors will be less
influenced by executives if they have a term of three years instead of one year. Second,
staggered boards reduce annual turnover on the board, thereby promoting board stability.
2.3.3 A staggered board -poison pill combination
The simultaneous use of both a staggered board and poison pill is viewed as an
extremely effective takeover defense strategy because it requires the hostile bidder to win
multiple proxy contests over a period of up to two years before obtaining control of the
board and redeeming the pill. Empirical evidence provides supports for the strength of the
board-pill combination: Bebchuk et al. (2002) find that not a single hostile bidder managed
to win control against a target with an effective staggered board in the five year period from
1996 to 2000. Furthermore, Daines (2001) argues that Delaware's takeover friendly rules are
one of the reasons why Delaware firms had higher market valuations than non-Delaware
firms prior to the Delaware regime shift, and Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find that staggered
board firms typically had lower valuations than non-staggered board firms post-1995. Next,
I discuss how the changes in Delaware's takeover regime affected the ability of Delaware
firm managers to engage in quiet life behavior was increased as a result of changes in the
validation of the use of a staggered board - poison pill combination.
2.4 The effect of the Delaware regime shift on managers' ability to engage in quiet life
behavior.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find evidence that managers protected from the
threat of takeovers exert less effort to maximize firm value, consistent with managerial
preferences for a 'quiet life'. Such preferences are a manifestation of agency conflicts
between managers and owners of a firm. Agency conflicts arise because managers and
owners have diverging incentives - managers control the firm's assets but typically do not
have a significant equity stake in the firm (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Hence, managers maximizing their personal welfares are sometimes inclined to take
actions that are not in the best interests of shareholders (e.g. shirking or quiet life behavior).
Agency conflicts cannot be fully resolved using contracts because of the substantial costs
associated with writing and enforcing complete contracts (Fama and Jensen, 1993). Thus, in
order to reduce conflicts, incomplete contracts are supplemented with corporate governance
mechanisms such as board of directors, institutional stockholders, managerial ownership, the
market for corporate control and financial reporting.
Changes in Delaware's takeover legal protection in the mid-1990s reduced the
effectiveness of governance from the market for corporate control and in turn, increased
agency costs and managerial incentives to engage in quiet life behavior. The regime shift
increased the ability of Delaware firms to use a poison pill-staggered board combination - a
nearly impenetrable defense - to block against hostile takeovers. Legal scholars and
financial economists have examined the effects of the regime shift on managerial behavior. I
discuss this work next.
2.5 Prior research examining the Delaware regime shift
Prior work finds that the Delaware regime shift affects managerial behavior. Rauh
(2006) examines whether the regime shift affects managerial incentives to encourage
employee stock ownership. If greater employee stock ownership functions as a takeover
defense mechanism, increases in takeover protection arising from the regime shift should
reduce managerial incentives to encourage employee stock ownership. Rauh's results
suggest that following the regime shift, the proportion of stock held by employees decrease
by amounts similar to what would be expected if firms stopped making defined contribution
plan contributions in employee stock.
Low (2008) examines how equity based compensation affects managerial risk-taking
behavior around the Delaware regime shift. She finds that managers with low equity-based
incentives decrease firm risk following changes in Delaware takeover protection regime, and
the risk reductions are associated with decreases in stock prices. Furthermore, she finds
some evidence that firms respond to the regime shift by increasing managerial incentives for
risk taking, but does not examine if increases in managerial incentives mitigate quiet life
behavior. In the next section, I turn to the role of financial reporting in mitigating the
adverse effects of managerial preferences for a quiet life.
3. Hypothesis Development
In this section, I discuss the governance role of financial reporting conservatism in
monitoring and disciplining managerial behavior and develop predictions about how
financial reporting conservatism can mitigate adverse outcomes from managerial
preferences for a quiet life.
3.1 The role offinancial reporting conservatism in mitigating agency costs
The governance role of financial reporting can help mitigate agency conflicts
between managers and owners of a firm. Financial reporting serves as a direct input for
numerous governance mechanisms by providing those mechanisms with verifiable
information about firm performance, which in turn reduces information asymmetry between
managers and stakeholders of a firm. Information in financial reports enables the firm's
owners and other stakeholders to monitor and evaluate both managerial performance (for
example, Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Kanodia and Lee,
1988) and managerial decisions and strategies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Bushman and
Smith, 2001).
Governance from financial reporting likely operates in conjunction with other
elements of a firm's corporate governance system including the market for corporate
control, boards of directors, debt holders, executive compensation, and institutional
investors. All these mechanisms likely rely on verifiable financial reports to either evaluate
managerial/firm performance or engage in contracts with the firm.4 Hence, I argue that
4 Note that boards of directors and certain groups of debtholders typically have access to non-public
information about a firm (such as budgets and forecasts). While such information can help to evaluate
managerial performance, the accuracy of such information is typically void of independent auditor attestation,
and hence, complements verifiable financial reports.
financial reporting plays a first order role in a firm's system of corporate governance, and
therefore is an important governance mechanism to examine in the extant setting.
Conservatism in financial reporting is an important characteristic of a firm's
accounting practices. Watts (2003) notes that conservatism can help stakeholders reduce
agency costs that arise from information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders.
Conservatism achieves this by imposing an asymmetric verification requirement for the
recognition and disclosure of losses vs. gains, and thus provides stakeholders with a
relatively timelier signal to investigate reasons for reported losses and discontinue negative
net present value projects and/or discipline managers (Ball, 2001; Watts, 2003a). '
Following the Delaware regime shift, the effectiveness of the governance and
monitoring role of the market for corporate control in Delaware decreases substantially
while other governance mechanisms still function to monitor and discipline managers. I
argue that the role of financial statement information is magnified in this period as a source
of information for stakeholders to monitor and discipline managers. Firms that have
relatively more conservative financial statements report adverse outcomes arising from
managerial preferences for a quiet life in a timelier manner, providing stakeholders with
timelier information with which to monitor and discipline those managers. Furthermore,
managers likely understand that the outcomes of their actions are recognized in financial
reports in a timelier fashion when financial statements are conservative, which reduces
managerial incentives to engage in non-value maximizing actions.
5 Recent work by Armstrong et al. (2009) examines the effect of the changes in BC laws on both the degree of
financial statement informativeness and overall information asymmetry. Their evidence suggests that firms
respond to BC laws by increasing financial statement informativeness and reducing asymmetry. They argue
that their findings are "consistent with the view that external corporate governance mechanisms such as the
market for corporate control (i.e., state antitakeover statutes) and financial reporting transparency are
substitutes". My work is complementary to their study in that I find that the governance role of financial
reporting conservatism acts to curb the adverse effects of quiet life behavior.
A natural question that arises is if managers' actions are self-dealing, then couldn't
managers' merely reduce conservatism in financial reports to reduce the timeliness with
which bad news is recognized. Such actions delay the recognition of bad news, masking
adverse outcomes arising from quiet life behavior and the resulting adverse effects for a
manager's job security and compensation. This scenario is unlikely to occur for a number of
reasons including stockholder demands for conservatism and/or independent verification of
financial statements by external auditors. Further, if managers change their accounting
policies, auditors are typically required to disclose the nature of the change. This further
restricts managerial ability to make unobservable changes in financial reports.
Based on the discussion above, I expect that financial reporting plays a pronounced
governance role for Delaware firms following the regime shift. The change in the
effectiveness of the market for corporate control increases the importance of the governance
role of financial reporting in the post period. In this period, all Delaware firms are likely to
experience declines in performance as the effects of preferences for a quiet life are realized.
However, Delaware firms with higher quality financial reporting will have less ability to
engage in quiet life behavior and hence will have stronger (i.e. less adverse) effects relative
to Delaware firms with relatively lower quality financial reports. Turning to non-Delaware
firms, as the regime shift only affects Delaware firms, non-Delaware firms do not
systematically experience changes in the market for corporate control around the regime
shift. Hence, while it is entirely plausible that financial reporting can also mitigate quiet life
behavior for non-Delaware firms, in practice, the market for corporate control may be more
effective than FRQ in governing non-Delaware firms. I remain agnostic about the role of
FRQ for non-Delaware firms and draw attention to the fact that non-Delaware firms are not
affected by the regime shift and therefore should not be subject to a change in the role of
FRQ around the regime shift for non-Delaware firms (which does not also affect Delaware
firms, i.e. a market-wide effect). The discussion above leads to my first hypothesis:
Hi: Following the Delaware regime shift, there is a positive relation between firm
performance and financial reporting quality for Delaware firms relative to non-
Delawarefirms.
Next, I examine the effect of FRQ on Delaware firms' capital investment around the
regime shift. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find that after the passage of takeover laws
in the late 1980s, firms shielded from takeovers have lower levels of plant births and deaths,
consistent with managers exerting lower levels of effort with respect to their firms' capital
investment activities when the threat of a takeover subsides.6  Such managerial
action/inaction can have adverse effects for both firm productivity and performance because
of the resulting decreases in product quality and/or competitiveness. For example, managers
may forgo investments in new technology, reduce plant and machinery maintenance, and/or
shirk from the effort required to terminate or close underperforming plants.
The outcomes of managerial shirking with respect to capital investment decisions are
reflected in financial reports and the timeliness with which the adverse outcomes are
recognized is increasing in financial reporting conservatism. Timelier disclosure of adverse
outcomes facilitates monitoring by stakeholders and boards, who likely investigate the root
causes of the decrease in performance. For instance, upon obtaining reports about decreasing
6 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) examine changes in plant-level capital expenditures but do not find
statistically significant results in support of the quiet life hypothesis. They note that due to data availability
constraints, the sample size for those tests are "substantially smaller" than for other tests in their paper.
profitability, boards may request additional information and analysis from managers and
take appropriate action to limit further losses.
Timelier monitoring by stakeholders and boards can affect capital expenditure
activity. One plausible scenario is that monitors (e.g. shareholders or boards), of a firm that
reports adverse changes in performance, may direct managers to increase investment in
order to improve performance. Under such a scenario, I expect that subsequent to the
Delaware regime shift, timelier recognition of losses results in greater capital investment
expenditures. This leads to:
H2a: Following the Delaware regime shift, there is a positive relation between capital
investment and financial reporting quality for Delaware firms relative to non-
Delawarefirms.
Next, I argue that financial reporting conservatism can mitigate quiet life behavior
with respect to overinvestment. Overinvestment occurs because managers do not terminate
value-decreasing activities in the post regime shift period. The intuition is as follows:
Managers who are acting to maximize firm value would likely terminate value-destroying
plants. Such activities require managerial effort, both in terms of the identification of sub-
optimal plants and the logistical and administrative requirements to shut down a given
plant.7 Prior to the regime shift, all firms are disciplined to terminate value decreasing plants
or operations because of the threat of the market for corporate control. Following the regime
shift, managerial preferences for a quiet life results in decreased plant death activity for
Delaware firms protected from the market for corporate control, cetirus paribus.
7 Upon the announcement of a plant closure, it is highly likely that managers would be confronted by
aggravated employees, unions and be faced with other undesired activities such as ensuring that the plant
closure is in accordance with Occupational Health and Safely regulations.
Prior work by Ball (2001) and Watts (2003) argue that the timelier recognition of
losses can bring forward managerial decisions to divest value-decreasing investments. If
managers understand that losses incurred from negative NPV investments will be recognized
during their tenure, they are more likely to divest the investments in a timelier manner to
limit the extent of the losses. Accordingly, if financial reporting plays a magnified role in the
post period, I expect greater conservatism can curb the decreased plant death activity in the
post regime shift period, i.e. conservatism is positively associated with Delaware plant-death
activity in the post-regime shift period. Formally stated:
H2b: Following the Delaware regime shift, there is a positive relation between plant-
death activity and financial reporting quality for Delaware firms relative to non-
Delawarefirms.
3.2 Cross sectional predictions
In this section, I examine whether the role of financial reporting in mitigating quiet
life behavior is affected by the severity of the quiet life problem. I identify two variables to
proxy for the severity of the quiet life problem: the level of market competition faced by the
firm and the presence of a staggered board.
First, I examine whether the positive relation between financial reporting and
operating performance for Delaware firms post-regime shift is affected by product market
competition. All else equal, firms operating in less competitive environments are faced with
relatively less discipline from market competition, and hence managers of those firms have
greater incentives to engage in quiet life behavior. On the other hand, managers of firms
operating in competitive industries have limited scope to take actions consistent with
preferences for a quiet life because of pressure to reduce slack and inefficiencies. Giroud
and Mueller (2008) provide some empirical evidence.8 Using the passage of business
combination laws in the late 1980's, Giroud and Mueller (2008) only observe adverse
effects of managerial preferences for a quiet life for firms in less competitive industries. This
leads to my third hypothesis:
H3: After the Delaware regime shift, the predicted positive relation between operating
performance and financial reporting quality for Delaware firms relative to non-
Delaware firms is more pronounced for firms operating in less competitive
industries.
In my next set of tests, I consider that the Delaware takeover regime shift centered
around the validity of the use of a staggered board-poison pill combination to repel hostile
bids. Ex-post, Delaware firms with both mechanisms have the greatest protection from
hostile takeovers, and incentives to lead the quiet life are expected to be strongest for
managers of these firms. I expect that the governance and monitoring role of financial
reporting is likely to have the greatest effect in curbing value decreasing managerial actions
for firms with the strongest takeover protection mechanisms. On the other hand, in the pre-
regime shift period, Delaware court rulings limited the power of firms to use the staggered
board-poison pill combination to defend against hostile bids.9
8 While empirical evidence the argument that industry competition mitigates managerial slack exists, attempts
to formalize the argument have met with mixed results - see Hart (1983), Scharfstein (1988) and Hermalin
(1992). Holmstram and Tirole (1989) conclude that "...the simple idea that product market competition
reduces slack is not as easy to formalize as one might think".
9 For instance, in Moran v. Household International Inc. (1985), the Delaware Supreme Court noted that a
target's right to use a poison pill against hostile takeovers was not absolute and that the use of the pill would be
subject to judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, in City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc. (1988), the Delaware
Chancery Court ordered for the withdrawal of the target's poison pill, thus allowing shareholders to decide for
themselves whether to accept the hostile bid.
I classify Delaware firms into two groups - those with a staggered board (staggered
board firms) and firms without a staggered board (non-staggered board firms). I do not
require staggered boardfirms to have poison pills in place ex-ante because the speed with
which a poison pill can be implemented suggests that staggered board-only firms are similar
to firms with staggered board-poison pill combination in place (Coates, 2000).10 This leads
to my final hypothesis:
H4: Following the regime shift, the predicted positive relation between operating
performance and financial reporting quality for Delaware firms is more pronounced
for strong takeover defense firms.
10 A limitation of my tests is the unavailability of data to differentiate between staggered board firms that do/do
not have recourse to a poison pill, with the latter group having characteristics similar to 'weak takeover defense
firms'. I consider this possibility in my sensitivity tests.
4. Research Design
4.1 Empirical estimation offinancial reporting quality
In this section, I focus on the empirical estimation of attributes of financial reporting
quality: timely loss recognition, timely gain recognition and the overall timeliness of
financial reporting. Financial reporting quality has been the subject of much examination in
the accounting literature and numerous proxies that attempt to capture the attributes of
financial reporting have been developed (see Dechow et al., 2009 for a summary). I focus on
conservatism in financial reporting for a number of reasons. First, conservatism has been
posited to have a governance role (Ball, 2001; Watts, 2003; LaFond and Roychowdhury,
2008). Second, given that quiet life behavior is expected to have adverse effects on
performance, examining how the timeliness of these adverse effects are reflected in
performance is a potentially interesting and natural choice of accounting property to
examine. Next, I turn to my choice of conservatism measures.
I examine multiple properties of conservatism. First, I consider asymmetric
timeliness of earnings with respect to bad news. Next, I consider earnings timeliness, in
terms of good news timeliness as well as overall earnings timeliness. I examine the effects
of timely gain recognition as well as overall timeliness of a firm's financial reporting as
prior work identifies these characteristics of financial reporting conservatism as being
informative to stakeholders (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006). Timely gain recognition improves
the timeliness of accounting earnings and therefore is expected to make earnings a more
informative measure of a borrower's performance (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006; Guay, 2006;
Guay and Verrecchia, 2006). Further, timely gain recognition allows managers to bring
forward earnings, which could mask the adverse effect of quiet life behavior. The overall
timeliness of a borrower's financial reporting, for both gains and losses, has been shown to
be associated with the borrower's transparency (Ball et al., 2008).
I use proxies developed by Khan and Watts (2009) to measure conservatism. While a
number of other conservatism measures have been discussed in the literature, the Khan and
Watts proxies offer the important advantage of being firm-year measures without requiring
historical time series data. This is in contrast to measures such as the Basu measure (Basu,
1997) and the Givoly and Hayn (2000) measures, all of which require the use of historical
time-series data to estimate measures of conservatism. The use of such measures is
problematic in my setting because the exogenous shock to firms arising from the Delaware
regime shift can influence a firm's choice of reporting conservatism. Hence, the effect of
any such changes in reporting conservatism around the regime shift is likely to be masked
for measures that would require the use of pre-period data to estimate post-period
conservatism.
The Khan and Watts (2009) firm-year measures of conservatism are linear functions
of firm specific characteristics expected to vary theoretically and empirically with
conservatism. The characteristics are firm size, market-to-book, and leverage. The
regression model is based on the methodology in Basu (1997), which is used to provide
weights used to linearly aggregate the firm-specific characteristics above into a composite
conservatism index. GScore is the measure of earnings timeliness with respect to good news,
CScore is the asymmetric timeliness with respect to bad news, and BScore captures the total
bad news timeliness. The empirical model used to estimate GScore, CScore and BScore is as
follows:
Ei,t= pi + p2Di,t + Rit (i + p2Sizei,t+ p3M/Bij + p4Levi,t) + Di, Ri, (%i + X2Sizei,t +X3M/Bi,t +
XALevi,t) + p3Sizei,t + f4M/Bi,t + p5Levi,t + si,t (a)
Equation (a) is estimated using annual cross-sectional regressions, and the measures are then
computed by summing the resulting coefficient estimates from equation (a):
GScore = pij + p2,t Sizei,t + p3, M/Bi,t + 4,t Levi,t (b)
CScore = k,t+ 2,t Sizei,t + X, M/Bi, + X4,t Levi,t (c)
BScore = GScore + CScore (d)
The definitions of the variables used in the above model are as follows: i indexes the firm, t
indexes time, E is earnings deflated by market value of equity at the end of the prior fiscal
year (COMPUSTAT #18 / (#25 * #199)), R is returns, calculated by cumulating monthly
returns for the 12 months starting from the fourth month after the firm's prior fiscal year end
(Hayn, 1995; Basu, 1997), D is a dummy variable equal to 1 when R<O and equal to 0
otherwise, Size is log of the market value of equity, i.e. Log(COMPUSTAT #25 * #199),
M/B is measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end
of the year (COMPUSTAT #25 * #199), and Leverage is the sum of long term debt and debt
in current liability, deflated by market value of equity ((COMPUSTAT #9 + #34) / (#25 *
#199)).
4.2 Differences in differences methodology
To conduct empirical tests, I use a differences-in-differences methodology, as used
by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and numerous other studies that examine the effects of
changes in takeover regimes (e.g. Rauh, 2006; Giroud and Mueller, 2008; Low, 2008).
For the standard differences-in-differences approach, outcomes are observed for two
groups for two time periods - in this study the periods correspond to prior to and following
the Delaware regime shift. One of the groups is exposed to a treatment (i.e. Delaware firms
are exposed to the regime shift) in the second period but not in the first period. This group is
called the treatment group. The other group, called the control group (non-Delaware firms)
is not exposed to the treatment in either period. The first level of differencing compares
outcomes (where outcomes in this study refer to the effect of financial reporting on
operating performance or capital investment) before and after the regime shift separately for
firms in the control group and the treatment group. The second difference compares changes
in treatment firms relative to changes in the control group.
I estimate the following regression for Delaware firms and non-Delaware firms:
DEPVARi = ai +, 8 AFTi, + /2 FRQ, + /s AFT, * FRQi, /4 Xi, + e (1)
where DEPVARi represents a variable to capture H1, H2a or H2b. To test HI,
DEPVARi is set to ROAil, calculated as income before extraordinary items scaled by total
assets ((COMPUSTAT #18 / #6) x 100). To test H2a, DEPVARi, is set to INVESTMENTi,,
calculated as capital expenditure (from the Statement of Cash Flows) scaled by lagged
PP&E; ((COMPUSTAT #128 / #8t-,) * 100). To test H2b, DEP_VARj, is Asset Sales scaled
by lagged PP&E ((COMPUSTAT #107 / #8t.1) * 100).
In equation 1 (2), AFT is a dummy variable set to 1 if the observation is in or after
1996. FRQ represents a firms financial reporting quality, captured using CScore, BScore or
GScore. CScore and BScore (GScore) are increasing (decreasing) in financial reporting
quality. Xu is a vector of control variables (discussed below). In all regressions, I cluster
standard errors by firm and year (Petersen, 2009).
In equation (1), p1 captures the incremental effect of the regime shift on operating
performance (or capital investment) relative to pre-regime shift years. Under a quiet life
hypothesis p1 is predicted to have a negative sign, representing lower levels of operating
performance (capital investment) in the post-regime shift period. A significant difference
between /p for the Delaware and non-Delaware firm regressions is consistent with quiet life
behavior. $2 (FRQut) captures the effect of financial reporting quality on performance (capital
investment) in the pre-regime shift period. If the governance role of financial reporting
complements the governance from the market for corporate control, then /2 is predicted to
have a positive sign. However if financial reporting is a substitute for the market for
corporate control, then #2 may not have a positive coefficient. Next, 3 can be interpreted as
the incremental effect of financial reporting quality in the post-regime shift period. My
central prediction is that the effect of financial reporting is greater in the post-regime shift
period for Delaware relative to non-Delaware groups. Hence, I predict that the difference
between p3 for the Delaware and non-Delaware groups is positive.
In all econometric specifications, I attempt to control for firm, governance and other
operating environment characteristics that could explain cross-sectional differences in a
firm's operating performance or capital investment actions. I discuss these control variables
next.
For empirical tests where ROA is the dependent variable, I include controls for firm
specific and governance characteristics, as well as the information environment. Firm-
specific controls include FirmSize (log of Market Value of Equity at year end; (Ln
(COMPUSTAT #199 * #25)), Book to Market (Book value of equity divided by Market
Value of Equity; (COMPUSTAT #6 - #181) / (#25 * #199)), Leverage (Total liabilities
scaled by Book Value of Equity; (COMPUSTAT #181 / (#6 - #18 1))), and Firm Age (the
number of years since the firm first appeared on COMPUSTAT). I expect Firmsize,
Leverage and Firm Age to be positively associated with performance, and Market to Book to
be negatively associated with ROA.
I also control for a number of corporate governance characteristics that can influence
managerial behavior. First, I control for the strength of shareholder rights at the firm level
using G-Index, a measure developed by Gompers at al. (2003)." The measure is negatively
related to the strength of shareholder rights. I expect that managerial incentives to engage in
quiet life behavior are decreasing in shareholder rights, hence implying that G-Index has a
negative relationship with performance. Next, I control for the level of blockholder
monitoring using the proportion of stock held by institutions during the contemporaneous
fiscal year (InstitutionalHolding%; with data obtained from Thomson Reuters, and
measured as total stock held by institutions at fiscal year end scaled by outstanding number
of shares at year end). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that institutional investors can
monitor mangers, and hence act in a governance capacity. I also control for executive
compensation with the proportion of outstanding stock held by the CEO at the end of the
contemporanous fiscal year (CEOStockholding%). I use Execucomp for compensation data.
Next, I use I/B/E/S to calculate the analyst following for each firm. I calculate the average
number of analysts following a firm over the contemporaneous fiscal year
(AnalystFollowing) to proxy for a firm's information environment. AnalystFollowing can
" Data for GIndex is only available for the 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000 fiscal years during my sample
period. For years missing Glndex values, I use the most recent lagged Glndex value.
also act as a corporate governance proxy because analysts are widely viewed as external
monitors of manager's actions (Hope and Thomas, 2008). I expect a positive relation
between ROA and InstitutionalHolding%, CEOStockholding% and AnalystFollowing.
Empirical tests examining the effect of financial reporting quality on capital
investment (H2a) and asset sales (H2b) also include numerous control variables. First, I
discuss controls for the determinants of investment. I control for contemporaneous Return
on Equity (ROE), calculated as Income before Extraordinary Items scaled by Total
Stockholders Equity (COMPUSTAT #18/(#6 - #181)). ROE captures the extent to which
firms have positive NPV projects and is expected to be positively associated with capital
investment and asset sales. Next, consistent with Welch and Wessels (2000), I control for
changes in Inventory (Inventory), calculated as the change in scaled inventory
(COMPUSTAT ((#3t / #6t) - (#3t1 / #6t1)). Firms with unusual increases in inventory could
respond by decreasing investment or shutting down plants. Alternatively, it is possible that
firms might increase inventories and investment in anticipation of future demand. Hence, I
do not have an ex-ante prediction for the sign on Inventory for tests of Investment or Asset
sales. Next, I control for the firm's Book to Market ratio (Book value of equity divided by
Market Value of Equity; (COMPUSTAT #6 - #18 1) / (#25 * #199)) as a proxy for the size
of the firm's investment opportunity set. I expect investment and asset sales to be positively
associated with the presence of growth options, and hence predict a negative coefficient on
Book to Market. Next, I include a control for changes in Dividend Payouts (Dividends).
Decreases in investment opportunities should result in an increase in dividend payouts, i.e.
there is a substitution effect between investment and dividends. Alternatively, managers
could use excess free cash flow to simultaneously pay dividends and fund managerial pet
projects. This leads to a complementary relation between investment and dividends. I
calculate Dividends as the change in Dividends Paid from t-1 to t, measured as
COMPUSTAT #21t/#6t - #2 1../# 6 11. I also control for the size of the firm's cash holdings
(Cash) as firms may retain greater cash reserves in anticipation of future capital
expenditures. Cash is calculated as the scaled change in cash holdings from t-1 to t all
multiplied by 100, i.e. ((COMPUSTAT #3t/#6t - #3t-1/#6t.1)*100) I expect cash to be
positively (negatively) associated with capital investment (asset sales). I also control for
lagged annual stock returns (Lag Return) as well as Firm Age. These variables are expected
to respectively be positively and negatively associated with both investment and disposals.
Finally, I also include controls for the number of analysts following a firm
(AnalystFollowing), as well as governance controls including InstitutionalHolding%,
CEOStockholding% and G-Index, which are all as previously described. I expect that
stronger governance is positively associated with capital expenditure as well as disposal
activity in the post regime shift period.
To test Hypothesis 1-3, I pool the Delaware and non-Delaware samples and then
estimate the following equation:
DEPVARit = ai +, 8 AFTit + 2 FRQit + /s AFTi, * FRQiI + 34 X + 3s DEL, + 36 AFTi, *
DELi, + /7 FRQi * DELi, + /3 AFTit * FRQi, * DELi, + / 9X * DELit +e (2)
where DELi, is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm is incorporated in Delaware
and all other variables are as previously described. Equation (2) includes all the variables
from Equation (1) with the difference being that all the variables are included a second time
and interacted with DELi. The significance of the 8 interaction coefficient term is the
estimate of the significance of the difference between the coefficients from equation (1) for
the incremental governance role of financial reporting as calculated separately for Delaware
and non-Delaware firms.
4.3 Measure of industry competition
For empirical tests examining whether industry competition affects the role of
financial reporting quality on firm performance and capital investment, I use the Herfindahl
Hirschman index (HHI) to measure industry competition, and partition firms into two groups
based on the level of industry competition. The HHI is defined as the sum of squared market
shares,
H H 1V: = 
N s
where sy is the market share of firm i in industry j in year t. Market shares are calculated
using sales (#12) from Compustat. The measure is decreasing in industry competition.
Consistent with Giroud and Mueller (2008), industries are determined at the 3-digit SIC
code level.' 2 I use the first year following the Delaware regime shift to determine the level
of industry competition.13
4.4 Tests examining the effect of the presence of a staggered board
Tests of Hypothesis 4 are performed by estimating Equation (1) on a subsample of
firms that are incorporated in Delaware. I do not examine differences between the effect of
the presence of a staggered board for Delaware and non-Delaware firms as non-Delaware
firms represent firms in 49 states, rendering it difficult to develop an understanding of the
role of staggered boards for non-Delaware firms. A limitation of this approach is that my
1 Empirical results are qualitatively similar when I use 2-digit or 4-digit SIC codes as partitions. I windsorize
HHI values at the 1% and 99% levels.
" In sensitivity tests, I use 1994 and 1995 to compute the HHI index. Reported results are unchanged using
these alternate specifications.
tests will not be able to incorporate the benefits associated with the differences-in-
differences design used for my other empirical tests.
5. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
5.1 Sample
I create my primary dataset by combining financial, accounting, governance and
other firm and manager specific data from multiple sources. Table 1 outlines the sample
selection procedure. My sample period is the five year period prior to and following the
regime shift in 1995, i.e. a period of 11 years from 1990-2000. I begin with the merged
CRSP/ Compustat Industrial (Annual) population and retain firms with state of incorporation
data. This results in 104,260 firm year observations. I require firms to be in the dataset in the
year preceding the regime shift (i.e. in 1994), a restriction that reduces the sample to 35,295
firm year observations. Consistent with prior work, I delete financial firms (SIC codes 6000-
6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) because of variation in federal regulation that
affects the corporate governance of these firms. This reduces my sample by 4,704
observations, leaving 30,591 firm-year observations.
I then retain observations for which I have CScore data. This leaves me 12,479 firm
year observations1 4 . Finally, I require observations to have valid data from Execucomp for
CEO Stockholding data, Thomson Reuters for Institutional Holding data, I/B/E/S for analyst
following data, G-Index data, obtained from Andrew Metrick's website and data from
Compustat in order to calculate required financial variables. 5 After imposing these data
requirements, my final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 6,879 firm years for
" Khan and Watts (2009) remove negative Book Value of Equity firms from their sample. As I restrict my
sample to observations from Khan and Watts (2009), a limitation of my study is the sample is restricted to
relatively healthier firms that have the incentive and ability to engage in quiet life behavior.
"I thank Andrew Metrick for providing G-Index data on his website:
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/am859/.
regressions examining operating performance, and 6,241 firm year observations for
regressions examining the effects of the regime shift on capital investment.16
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2, Panel A outlines industry membership for Delaware and Non-Delaware
incorporated firms at 1994. Computers and Textile/Print/Publish firms comprise the largest
groups for Delaware incorporated firms, with approximately one quarter of the total
Delaware sample. Non-Delaware incorporated firms have the greatest representation in the
Textiles/Print/Publish, Retail and Transportation industries, with these industries combining
for nearly one quarter of the total Non-Delaware firm sample. Evidence from this table
suggests that results are unlikely to be driven by industry membership.
Table 2, Panel B outlines the states in which Delaware and non-Delaware firms are
headquartered. Approximately half of all Delaware firms are headquartered in one of four
states: California, Illinois, New York and Texas. Non-Delaware incorporated firms appear to
have greater dispersion in their choice of headquarters - no state has greater than 11% of all
firms (Ohio). Evidence in Panel B suggests that there is little congruence between a firm's
state of incorporation and state of location which reduces the likelihood that my empirical
results are driven by effects at the state location.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for Delaware and non-Delaware incorporated
firms as at 1994. Both groups have similar market capitalization and sales mean values.
Non-Delaware firms report relatively higher average ROA and are slightly less levered than
Delaware firms. Both groups of firms appear to have similar governance characteristics-
analyst following, CEO stock ownership and G-Index scores are similar for both groups of
16 All Compustat variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99% levels.
firms. Investment is significantly different for both groups, with Delaware firms reporting
higher investment levels than non-Delaware firms.
Table 4 displays correlation tables. Panel A (B) shows Spearman and Pearson
correlations for tests of FRQ on performance (Investment/Asset Sales) and control variables.
As expected, correlations between my measures of FRQ are significantly different than zero
and positive in both Panels. Turning to Panel A, both measures of FRQ are negatively
correlated with firm size, ROA, and age, and positively correlated with leverage, consistent
with expectations. Firm size is positively related to analyst following, institutional holding
and G-Index, and negatively related to the percentage of stock held by the CEO.
Turning to Panel B, Investment is significantly and negatively associated with both
CScore and BScore. As expected, investment is negatively associated with Firm Age, Book
to Market and Firm Age. Interestingly, Analyst Following, Institutional Ownership, CEO
Holding are all positively and significantly associated with investment.
Turning to Asset Sales, measures of conservatism are positively associated with asset
sales, consistent with timelier recognition of losses facilitating negative NPV project
divestment. Firm age and Book to Market are both positively associated with divestment,
consistent with firms in the steady or mature stage of their life cycle eliminating
underperforming assets. Interestingly, I find that Analyst Following and Institutional
Holding % are negatively associated with asset sales. One explanations is that analysts and
institutional investors invest in firms with growth options, which in turn is negatively
associated with asset sales.
6. Results
6.1 Main results
Table 5 presents regression results for tests of Hi. The first set of tests shows the
effect of the regime shift on firm behavior. The second, third and fourth set of tests show the
results of whether the governance role of financial reporting in the post-regime shift period
affects firm performance when the market for corporate control is no longer effective for
Delaware firms. Each set of tests includes results for Delaware and non-Delaware firms
separately, and then reports coefficients and t-stats for the difference between coefficients
for the Delaware and non-Delaware groups.
I use return on assets (ROA) to proxy for operating performance, where ROA is
Income before Extraordinary Items scaled by Total Assets. Column 1 and 2 display results
for regressions examining the effect of the regime shift on firm performance for Delaware
and non-Delaware firms respectively. AFT, the coefficient of interest, is negative and
significant for both groups. Column 3 presents t-tests of differences in coefficients for the
Delaware and non-Delaware regressions and the results indicate that post-regime shift,
Delaware firms have significantly worse performance than non-Delaware firms. This result
is consistent with a quiet life hypothesis: Delaware managers appear to take actions in the
post-regime shift period that are associated with reduced performance relative to both the
pre regime shift period and non-Delaware firms (which do not experience any systematic
changes in takeover defenses at the same point in time). In terms of economic significance,
the coefficient for AFT in column 3 implies that the drop in ROA after the regime shift is
approximately 8.7% (i.e. -0.866 x 100) for Delaware firms. This represents an average
decrease in ROA from 4.8% in the pre period to 4.4% in the post period (for Delaware
firms).
I find evidence that for Delaware firms post regime shift, greater asymmetric
timeliness and overall timeliness (using CScore and BScore respectively) are positively and
significantly associated with operating performance. First, I turn to results of tests that use
CScore to measure financial reporting quality. Column 4 & 5 report results using CScore as
a proxy for FRQ for Delaware and non-Delaware firms. I find evidence consistent with
financial reporting quality being positively associated with performance in the post regime
shift period when using either CScore, and this effect is significantly different to the effect
of FRQ for non-Delaware firms. 17 I also find similar results when using BScore (Columns
10-12) to measure total news timeliness.
Next, while I find some evidence that the level of good news timeliness (using
GScore to measure good news timeliness) is positively associated with performance for
Delaware firms in the post-regime shift period, this effect is not significantly different to
non-Delaware firms. This result coupled with the evidence above suggests that the
governance role of conservatism in mitigating quiet life behavior is driven by the timely
recognition of losses relative to gains, and that my results using BScore are driven by
asymmetric loss recognition rather than timely gain recognition.
The role of FRQ in the pre-regime shift period on performance is captured by $2. Ex-
ante, I predict that /2 should be > 0 (= 0) if FRQ and the market for corporate control are
substitutes (complements) and FRQ plays (does not play) a governance role in the post
period. It is also possible that p2 is negative due to the mechanical relation between
4 My empirical results are qualitatively similar when I cluster standard errors at the state-of-incorporation
level.
conservatism and performance: if a firm records losses in a relatively timelier manner, then
it is likely to cause a more negative relation between conservatism and performance relative
to another less conservative firm that does not record losses in a less timely manner. Results
in Table 5 where FRQ is set to either CScore, BScore or GScore indicate that the mechanical
effect appears to dominate over the governance effect of FRQ. Specifically, coefficient for
#2 is negative (and sometimes significant) for Delaware and non-Delaware firms. However,
in all scenarios, none of the tests of differences between coefficients are significant,
suggesting that the role of financial reporting in the pre-period is similar across groups.
However, my tests are focused on the incremental effect of FRQ (i.e. $2) in the post period
and as such I focus on the fact that given a change in the system of corporate governance
arising from the decreased effectiveness of the market for corporate control can affect the
role of FRQ in the post-regime shift period.
In sum, my results from Table 5 provide strong for the argument that Delaware firms
with higher (lower) conservatism have stronger (weaker) performance in the post-regime
shift period. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in CScore (BScore)
results in an increase in post regime shift ROA of approximately 19% for the average
Delaware firm relative to non-Delaware firms. A one standard deviation increase in CScore
is associated with an increase in ROA in the post regime shift period of 11.21 * 0.08 = 0.90,
or 19% (noting from Table 3 that the average pre-regime shift ROA for Delaware firms was
4.76) so 0.90 / 4.76 = 0.19. This result is consistent with financial reporting, and
specifically, the timelier recognition of bad news in financial reports, playing a magnified
role in the post-regime shift period when the market for corporate control is less effective in
governing Delaware firms.
Controls for firm size, book to market, leverage, analyst following and institutional
holdings are all significant at conventional levels. Consistent with expectations, firm size is
positively associated with performance. In tests using CScore and BScore, there is a
significantly greater effect of firm size on performance for Delaware firms than for non-
Delaware firms. As expected, ROA is negatively related to both Book to Market and
Leverage for all measures of conservatism. A negative coefficient on Book to Market is
consistent with firms with greater growth opportunities reporting higher performance.
Next, I find that contrary to expectations, average analyst following is negatively
related to performance for all firms using all measures of conservatism, and the differential
effect between DE and non-DE firms is statistically significant at the 10% for FRQ=CScore.
One possible explanation is that analysts may follow firms in more competitive industries
because of economies of scale in understanding industry-wide factors that affect firm
performance. Further, greater market competition is likely to be associated with lower levels
of profitability which could drive the negative coefficient for Analyst Following. Next, I find
that Institutional Holding% and CEO Holding% are both positively associated with
performance for all firms, consistent with these mechanisms playing a governance role.
Further, coefficients on G-Index are negative (but insignificant), consistent with managerial
protection and entrenchment increasing agency costs and adversely affecting performance.
This is consistent for all three measures of FRQ, a result that holds using any of my proxies
for conservatism.
The adjusted R-square values are similar across tests using any of CScore, GScore or
BScore to proxy for FRQ - the value is between 18% and 27%, suggesting a reasonable
level of fit for the model. Overall, the results in Table 5 are consistent with hypothesis 1 and
provide support for the argument that financial reporting can play a magnified role in
disciplining managerial quiet life behavior when the market for corporate control ceases to
effectively function as a governance mechanism.
Table 6 presents results of estimating the effect of financial reporting on post regime
shift capital expenditures. Empirical results support the thesis that financial reporting can
help mitigate reductions in quiet life behavior with respect to capital investment. First, I find
some evidence that Delaware firms reduce capital expenditures following the regime shift.
However, this effect is not significant at conventional levels, a result consistent with the
results in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) who do not find evidence that firms affected by
changes in Business Combination takeover laws reduce capital investment. However, using
plant level data, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find evidence of managerial inaction,
manifested though decreases in both plant births and deaths for firms affected by the
Business Combination laws. The second, third and fourth set of tests examine whether
capital investment activities are affected by FRQ for Delaware and non-Delaware firms and
provide t-tests of the differences between the groups. In each set of tests, FRQ is set to be
CScore, BScore and GScore respectively. A positive coefficient for AFT*FRQ is consistent
with the hypothesis that higher financial reporting quality is associated with higher levels of
capital expenditures post-regime shift.
For tests using all three FRQ proxies, I find evidence consistent with H2: the
coefficient on AFT*FRQ is positive both for Delaware firms and significantly greater when
compared to non-Delaware firms: t-tests of differences of coefficients are significant at the
5% level or better. Existing literature on the governance role of conservatism with respect to
investment suggests both an ex-ante and ex-post role (e.g., Ball, 2001, Watts, 2003). Ex-
ante, conservatism limits managerial investment in negative NPV projects because the losses
are more likely to be recorded during the manager's tenure. In an ex-post setting, Ball and
Shivakumar (2005) argue that under conservative accounting, managers have incentives to
act quickly to limit economic losses from poorly performing projects because without such
action, the losses would grow and also be recognized during the manager's tenure. I argue
that through an indirect effect, conservatism can also affects capital expenditures: As
previously discussed, conservatism speeds the recognition of adverse performance effects of
quiet life behavior. It is possible that the monitoring actions (by boards and/or stockholders)
arising from the signal of adverse performance can induce managers to undertake greater
levels of investment as a response to adverse performance. The results in Table 6 are
consistent with this argument.
In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in CScore is
associated with a 7% reduction in underinvestment that arise from managerial preferences
for a quiet life. This is determined as follows: The standard deviation for Delaware firms
CScore value is 0.08 (from Table 3). A one standard deviation increase in CScore is
associated with an increase in investment in the post regime shift period of 6.63 * 0.08 =
0.53, or 7.2% (noting that the average pre-regime shift investment for Delaware firms was
7.27: i.e. 0.53 / 7.27 = 0.097).
Next, I discuss results for control variables. For all tests, ROE is negatively
associated with capital expenditure, inconsistent with expectations. However this result is
insignificant at conventional levels. The change in inventory (Inventory) is negative and
significant for all tests of FRQ on Investment. In addition, this result is significantly
different for Delaware firms than for non-Delaware firms. I also find as expected, a negative
relation between firm age and capital investment. This is consistent with firms spending
proportionally less on investment over time. Next, Book to Market is also negatively related
to Investment, consistent with growth firms having greater levels of investment. I find no
significant relation between the change in Dividends (Dividends) and investment for all tests
of Delaware and non-Delaware groups. Cash Holdings are positively and significantly
associated with investment in all reported tests, and this effect is significantly different
between Delaware and non-Delaware firms for all tests. G-Index is positively associated
with Investment suggesting that greater managerial power results in higher levels of
investment, consistent with an empire-building story. Similarly, less monitoring by analysts
also results in greater levels of capital investment. I also find that neither the level of
institutional holdings nor CEO Holding % appears to significantly affect capital investment.
In summary, the results in Table 6 provide further evidence that financial reporting can play
a magnified governance role in disciplining managerial behavior when other governance
mechanisms such as the market for corporate control demonstrate a reduced ability to
discipline managerial behavior.
Table 7 displays results for tests of hypothesis 2b, which predicts that greater
conservatism should curb Delaware firms' quiet life behavior with respect to asset sales in
the post-regime shift period. The overall evidence provides some support for the prediction
above. Panel 1-3 show results for tests of the differences in disposal activity around the
regime shift. First, Panel 1 (2) displays results for Delaware firms (non-Delaware firms) and
Panel 3 provides t-tests of the differences between coefficients in Panels 1 and 2. In the post-
period, Delaware firms experience a small (but insignificant) in their asset sale behavior
relative to the pre-period whereas non-Delaware firms have a significant and positive
increase in asset sales relative to the pre-period. The difference between Delaware and non-
Delaware firms is negative and significant at the 10% level, but this result is driven by the
non-DE firms. A possible explanation is that the disciplinary role of the market for
corporate control in the pre-period has reduced the presence of negative NPV projects in the
post period. Panels 4-12 provide results of the effect of financial reporting conservatism
characteristic on disposal activity and the incremental effect in the post-regime shift period.
For tests using CScore, the coefficient for AFT in Column 4 (Delaware firms) is positive and
significant at 10% using a one tailed test. This implies that FRQ has a significant positive
impact on asset disposals, consistent with arguments in Ball (2001) and Watts (2003). This
result however, is not significantly different to non-Delaware firms. The coefficient for
AFT*FRQ is also positive and significant at the 10% level for a one-sided test, suggesting
that FRQ has a significantly greater effect on asset disposal activity in the post period. This
result holds for both Delaware and non-Delaware firms, which suggests that the incremental
role of FRQ in the post period is an economy-wide effect. I find similar empirical results to
those discussed above when using BScore instead of CScore. For tests using GScore to
measure FRQ, I expect that the timelier recognition of good news should be negatively
related to asset disposal activity. All else equal, greater good news timeliness should
increase the ability of mangers to mask poor performance. Results for AFT*FRQ in column
7 are consistent with this expectation. However, the effect of GScore in the post-period is
significantly greater for non-Delaware firms than for Delaware firms, contrary to
expectations.
Table 8 and 9 provide results for hypotheses 3 and 4, which examine whether the
relation between financial reporting quality and firm performance varies with the severity of
managerial incentives to engage in quiet life behavior. Table 8 provides results from tests of
my third hypothesis which predicts that the governance role of FRQ will play a greater
disciplinary role for firms subject to less competitive pressure. I partitions firms by the level
of product market competition, with competition determined using the HHI at the 4-digit
SIC code level. The HHI is calculated out of sample, using the entire population of
Compustat firms. Observations are ranked into deciles based on the level of industry
competition as at 1996 and the top and bottom four deciles are partitioned into two groups: a
high industry competition group and a low industry competition group. Panel A (B) displays
results of tests for firms operating in high and low competition industries where FRQ is set
to CScore (BScore). Turning to control variables, ROE, Inventory, Book to Market,
Dividends and Cash Holdings appear to affect disposal activity.
Evidence from Table 8, Panel A provide evidence that the governance role of
financial reporting is magnified in the post-period for Delaware firms operating in less
competitive environments. This effect is significantly greater for Delaware firms in the post
period. In Panel A, the coefficients for a t-test of the difference between the coefficients for
AFT*FRQ for Delaware and non-Delaware firms are positive and significant at the 5%
level, consistent with the argument that Delaware firms operating in less competitive
industries and with relatively greater asymmetric timeliness and have better performance in
the post regime shift period relative to non-Delaware firms. In Panel B, results are similar to
those in Panel A when I replace CScore with BScore. T-tests of the difference between
AFT*FRQ for Delaware and non-Delaware firms are insignificant for tests using both
CScore and BScore. R-squared values for all tests across the partitions are similar, ranging
from 0.15 to 0.26. In summary, my results suggest that the governance role of financial
reporting has the greatest effect on performance for firms that are not subject to high levels
of product market competition. For finns subject to competition, financial reporting does not
play a magnified governance role in the post period, but instead, can act in conjunction with
competition to discipline managerial actions.
Results in Table 9 provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 4: the governance role
of financial reporting is magnified for Delaware firms with staggered boards, i.e. when
managers are less subject to takeover threats. Panel A provide results for tests examining the
effect of FRQ on performance for Delaware firms with a staggered board, and Panel B
provide results for Delaware firms without a staggered board. While coefficients for
AFT*FRQ in Panel A and B are significant and positive for both CScore and BScore, the
coefficients in Panel A are statistically stronger. It is possible the results in Table 9 are
overstated because of the inability to use a non-Delaware control group to account for any
macroeconomic shocks or inter-temporal shocks.
6.2 Sensitivity tests and robustness checks
6.2.1 Alternative sample period: late-1980s multi-state adoption of antitakeover laws
My primary empirical results for the effect of FRQ on performance and capital
expenditures are qualitatively similar when I replicate my tests using the Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003) sample period and setting as displayed in Table 10. BM use exogenous
variation in governance in the form of business combination laws enacted in the late-1980s
by 30 states on a state-by-state basis. The Business Combination laws impose a moratorium
on a number of transactions including mergers and asset sales between a large shareholder
and the firm for a period from three to five years after a shareholder's stake has passed a
certain threshold. The passage of Business Combination laws in the late-1980s and the mid-
1990s Delaware regime shift differ in that the Delaware regime shift refers to a change in
the judicial interpretation of existing legislation, whereas the Business Combination laws
refer to a change in legislation. This difference suggests at least two potential benefits of
focusing on the Delaware regime shift setting.
First, the prevalence of data available in machine readable form is greater in the
period surrounding the Delaware regime shift than for the sample period in the Bertrand and
Mullainathan setting. Specifically, a number of control variables used in my main tests are
not available for the entire Bertrand and Mullainathan sample period. Specifically, CEO
Stockholding % is not available prior to 1990, G-Index is not available before 1990 and
Institutional Holding% is not available prior to 1980. A second benefit of using the
Delaware regime shift setting is that the possibility that the change in the market for
corporate control arises endogenously due to lobbying by a coalition of firms. I discuss this
issue further in Section 6.4.1.
6.2.2 Ex-ante managerial entrenchment
In this section, I consider the possibility that managerial entrenchment affects the
effectiveness of the governance role of financial reporting. On the one hand, entrenched
Delaware managers may not adjust their behavior following the regime shift as they are
already leading the quiet life prior to the regime shift. Hence, for such firms, it is possible
that the governance role of financial reporting does not play a magnified around the regime
shift. Under this argument, I expect that 3 from Equation (1) would be less pronounced for
entrenched Delaware firms. An alternative argument is that the governance role of financial
reporting is greater when managers are more entrenched, and even more so when the market
for corporate control is less effective. Under this argument, I expect /3 to be greater for
entrenched Delaware firms relative to other Delaware firms.
I measure the level of managerial entrenchment using the Entrenchment Index (E-
Index) developed in Bebchuk and Cohen (2009). The index identifies a subset of measures
from the Gompers et al. (2003) G-Index measure of corporate governance that are expected
to have the greatest effect on the level of managerial entrenchment. I partition sample firms
into two groups - High and Low Entrenchment based on the mean E-Index score from
Bebchuk and Cohen (2009).
Table 11 displays the results from empirical tests with firms partitioned by low and
high entrenchment. Panel A (B) displays results for tests where CScore (BScore) proxy for
FRQ. The collective evidence suggests that the governance role of financial reporting does
not have a significant effect in mitigating quiet life behavior for entrenched Delaware
managers. First, I find that entrenched Delaware firms do not display a significant decrease
in performance following the regime shift (relative to non-Delaware firms). I interpret this
as evidence that the increased protection from takeovers arising from the regime shift does
not increase the incentives for Delaware managers to engage in quiet life behavior
incremental to their quiet life incentives prior to the regime shift. Hence, if the regime shift
does not influence managerial behavior because managers are entrenched ex-ante and
already engaging in quiet life behavior, it is not clear that the governance role of financial
reporting should play a magnified role in the post period. Consistent with this, I find that the
financial reporting only plays a governance role in the post period for firms that engage in
quiet life behavior as a result of the regime shift - i.e. non-entrenched Delaware firms. For
these firms, the evidence in Panel A and B indicates that there is a positive association
between conservatism and performance in the post period, and that this effect is significantly
different for Delaware firms relative to non-Delaware firms. For tests in Panel A (B) using
CScore (BScore) the coefficient on FRQ * AFT is significant at the 1% level.
6.2.3 Post-regime shift roles of other governance mechanisms
In this section, I consider the possibility that multiple governance mechanisms (i.e.
mechanisms in addition to or other than financial reporting) play an increased governance
role in the post-regime shift period. In other words, it is possible that my primary empirical
specification suffers from an omitted correlated variable problem in the form of an
alternative governance mechanism that is correlated with financial reporting and plays an
increased governance role in the post regime shift period. I examine this possible issue by
adding controls that allow my governance control and information environment variables to
play an incremental role in the post regime shift period. Specifically, I interact Institutional
Holding percentage, CEO stockholding %, G-Index and Analyst following with AFTu and
include each of the interaction terms in my main empirical specification in addition to the
un-interacted variables.
Table 12 summarizes the results. First, I find evidence that CEO Holdings
(AFT*CEO Holding %) and G-Index (AFT*G-Index) have statistically significant magnified
governance roles in the post period. Interestingly, I find that the proportion of stock held by
institutional investors and the analyst following for a firm do not have a significant
incremental governance role in the pre and post period. Turning to the role of financial
reporting, the evidence in Table 12 suggests that financial reporting is still positively and
significantly associated with performance after controlling for the possible increased
governance role of various governance mechanisms in the post regime shift period. These
results are robust to the use of either CScore or BScore to measure FRQ. The coefficient on
AFT * FRQ is 11.82 (12.56) for Delaware firms for CScore (BScore) with a t-statistic of
2.06 (2.48). Importantly, when compared to non-Delaware firms, I find significant
differences between the coefficients on AFT * FRQ at the 5% level or better using both
CScore and BScore to measure FRQ.
6.2.4 Staggered boards without recourse to a poison pill
Table 13 presents results of tests of FRQ on performance after excluding firms
without a poison pill. Ceteris paribus, firms with a staggered board but without recourse to a
poison pill have weaker takeover defenses relative to firms with a staggered board-poison
pill combination: if a hostile bidder wins the first proxy contest to replace a third of a
target's staggered board, the acquirer will inevitably win a subsequent proxy contest and
obtain control of the board. Hence, upon losing the first proxy contest, the remaining
incumbent directors typically resign, and cede control to the hostile bidder (Bebchuk et al.,
2002). Ideally, I would like to identify firms without recourse to a poison pill and remove
these firms from the Delaware sample. However, data limitations limit my ability to
distinguish between firms without recourse to a poison pill and firms that have access to a
poison pill but do not preemptively maintain one.18 In other words, removing firms based on
the lack of poison pill may have the unintended consequence of removing observations that
are valuable to my tests - a case of 'throwing the baby out with the bathwater'. I
acknowledge this inability to differentiate between non-poison pill firms as a limitation of
the set of tests below. The evidence in Table 15 is consistent with my main findings in Table
18 Note that a poison pill can be implemented in under 24 hours in the event that a firm is the subject of a
takeover attempt. Hence, it is not imperative for firms to preemptively maintain a poison pill.
5, i.e. that greater financial reporting quality plays a magnified governance role in the post
regime shift period for Delaware.
6.2.5 Differential effects of staggered board establishment in the charter or the bylaws
In this section, I discuss results of tests that examine whether firms with staggered
boards established in a firm's charter have greater quiet life incentives than do firms with
staggered boards established through the bylaws. Shareholders cannot amend charter-based
staggered boards whereas they can amend or dismantled bylaws-based staggered boards.
Hence, as shareholders may amend their company's bylaws, bylaws-based staggered boards
do not provide boards with the same protection from removal by determined shareholders
that is provided by charter-based staggered boards (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2002). Empirical
evidence suggests that the presence of charter-based (bylaws-based) staggered boards is
associated with greater (smaller) decreases in firm value (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2002).
I reperform my main tests after excluding all firms with bylaws-based staggered
boards.19 The evidence in Table 14 is consistent with my primary results. I find evidence
that the subsample of charter-based staggered board firms engage in quiet life behavior as
there is less risk of shareholders dismantling the staggered board. While these results are
statistically stronger than those in my primary tests, the results are not economically
different to my main tests.
6.2.6 Alternative measure of executive compensation
Table 15 outlines the empirical results after replacing CEOHolding% with an
alternate measure of executive compensation that incorporates 1) CEO stockholding and 2)
total number of options held by the CEO; with both amounts scaled by the total number of
19 1 obtain data to differentiate charter-based and bylaws-based staggered boards from Lucian Bebchuk's
website: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml.
outstanding shares. Cheng et al (2006) find evidence that managers subject to protection
from takeovers divest their stock holdings ex-post. Hence, using both stock and option
holdings (CEOHolding%_2) may more effectively measure CEO stock-related incentives
relative to a measure that only incorporates the total percentage of outstanding stock held by
the CEO: CEOHolding%.
The evidence in Table 15 suggests that that my primary results are robust to the
alternate measure of executive compensation. The coefficient on FRQ * AFT is positive and
significant at the 5% level using either CScore or BScore to measure FRQ. Further, the role
of FRQ is significantly greater for Delaware firms than for other firms: the t-statistic is 2.42
(2.49) when I use CScore (BScore) to measure FRQ. The coefficient for CEOHolding%_2
using the alternate measure discussed above is also positive and significant for both
Delaware and non-Delaware firms, consistent with the results for CEOHolding% in my
primary results in Table 5.
6.2.7 Effect offirms located in California
Approximately 19% of all Delaware incorporated firms in the sample are
headquartered in California. To limit the possibility that state-level effects that only affect
firms headquartered in California drive my results, I rerun my tests after excluding
California firms from the sample. Empirical results displayed in Table 16 suggest that my
primary results are qualitatively similar when after excluding California firms. The role of
financial reporting in the post regime shift period is positive and significant at the 5% level
or better using both CScore and BScore, and this effect is significantly greater for Delaware
firms relative to other firms.
6.3 Additional Issues
6.3.1 Exogeneity of regime shift
An implicit assumption throughout this paper is that the regime shift is a shock to
Delaware firms that is exogenous in nature. To the best of my knowledge, there is no
evidence examining the validity of this assumption. Hence, I cannot rule out the possibility
that that the regime shift is a response to the political context and specifically, lobbying
actions by economic players in Delaware. However, this is unlikely for a number of reasons.
First, it would require that lobbying activities influenced the judicial decisions made by the
Delaware Supreme Court. Given the independent nature of the judicial process, this is
unlikely. Furthermore, it would likely be more costly for lobbyists to focus their efforts on
influencing the Delaware Supreme Court judicial body to change their interpretation of
existing laws as opposed to lobbying lawmakers to amend existing takeover protection laws.
Second, given that approximately 50% of US firms choose to incorporate in
Delaware (Daines, 2001), it seems unlikely that a small coalition of firms in Delaware
would be able to lobby a majority of Delaware Supreme Court judges and influence the
interpretation of existing laws.
6.3.2 Changes in reported state of incorporation
I consider the possibility that my results are driven by firms that anticipate poor
future performance and amend their state of incorporation to Delaware post-regime shift to
obtain takeover protection. Ideally, I would examine firm-level state of incorporation data
over time to identify firms that change their state of incorporation. However, COMPUSTAT
files only provide firms' present state of incorporation. Romano (1993) suggests that
changes in state of incorporation are quite rare. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) select 200
random firms from their sample only find three firms that change their state of
incorporation. They also find that none of the changes were timed to take advantage of
changes in takeover protection laws - all the changes preceded changes in legislation by a
number of years.
6.3.3 Post regime-shift enactment of staggered boards
It is possible that the presence of quiet life behavior in Delaware post-regime shift is
driven by Delaware firms that implement staggered boards after 1995 in order to exploit the
benefits of regime shift. This argument, however does not affect the role of financial
reporting in reducing quiet life behavior once Delaware firms have implemented staggered
boards. I examine whether firms switch their board structure (from a non-staggered board to
a staggered-board) in the post-regime shift period and find that 12 firms implement
staggered boards in that period. This represents approximately 2% of my sample of unique
Delaware firms and hence is unlikely to be driving my results.
7. Conclusion
I exploit changes in Delaware's takeover protection regime to examine whether the
governance role of financial reporting can mitigate the adverse effects that arise from
managerial preferences for a quiet life. I hypothesize that higher financial reporting quality
mitigates managerial value decreasing actions associated with a quiet life. In addition, I also
examine whether the governance role of FRQ is greater for firms for whom the severity of
the quiet life problem is greater.
I use a differences-in-differences methodology which allows me to examine the role
of financial reporting prior to and following the regime shift while controlling for both
aggregate market-wide effects and any Delaware-specific shocks. A key advantage of my
study is the identification of an exogenous shock that affects managerial incentives to
engage in non-value maximizing behavior, which in turn, allows me to present results that
are more consistent with a causal link between reporting quality and investment efficiency.
I use measures of financial reporting conservatism from Khan and Watts (2009) to
proxy for FRQ. Results from empirical tests are consistent with the hypothesis that greater
FRQ mitigates adverse effects arising from managerial preferences for a quiet life. I also
find evidence that the role of financial reporting in mitigating quiet life behavior is only
present for firms with staggered boards and for firms operating in less competitive
environments. Empirical results are robust to the inclusion of a number of controls as well as
to numerous other sensitivity and robustness tests.
Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Dummy that takes the value of 1 for the years 1996 and onwards and 0AFT
otherwise.
A firm's financial reporting quality (FRQ) proxied for using a measure of
asymmetric timeliness, discussed below.
FRQ = BScore Estimated based on the Khan and Watt (2009) model.
FRQ = CScore Estimated based on the Khan and Watt (2009) model.
FRQ = GScore Estimated based on the Khan and Watt (2009) model.
Market Cap The firm's market capitalization at year end (#199 * #25).
Total Assets ($m) Total Assets (#6).
Sales ($m) Total Sales (#12).
ROA Return on Assets multiplied by 100; measured as Income 
before Extraordinary
Items / Assets - (#18 / #6) * 100
Book to Market The firm's investment opportunity set measured as (#6 - #181) / (#25 * #199).
Leverage Total Debt / Equity measured as (#181 / (#6 - #181)).
Firm Size Log of the year end market value of equity measured as Ln(#199*#25).
Analyst Following Average number of analysts following the firm at year end.
Institutional Holding % Percentage of outstanding stock held by institutional investors.
CEO Stockholding % Percentage of outstanding stock held by the CEO.
G-Index Governance Index score from Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003).
Firm Age Number of years since the firm first appeared on Compustat.
Investment Capital Investment (from the Statement of Cash Flows) scaled by lagged 
PP&E
all multiplied by 100, and calculated as (#128 / #8t.1) * 100.
Asset Sales (from the statement of Cash Flows) scaled by lagged PP&E all
multiplied by 100, and calculated as (#107 / #8t.1) * 100.
ROE Return on Equity measured as #18 / (#6 - #181).
Change in inventory measured as change in (#3 / #6) from t- 1 to t and scaled byInventory 10
100.
Dividends Dividends ($m) scaled by total assets, measured as (#21 / #6).
Cash Change in cash holdings measured as change in (#1 / #6) from t- 1 to t.
Lag Return Prior fiscal year stock return.
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Table 1 - Sample Selection Procedure
Description of the process used to obtain at the final sample for the period from 1990
to 2000 inclusive.
Total Compustat population
Compustat population with state of incorporation data
Retain firms that exist in the year preceding the regime shift
Retain non-financial and utilities firms
Retain firms with CScore data
Retain firms with all required data
Firm-year
observations
121,181
104,260
35,295
30,591
12,479
6,879
Table 2. Industry membership and State of Location
Panel A reports sample observations in 1994 by two-digit SIC industry code. Firms are classified as being
incorporated either in Delaware or Non-Delaware states. Panel B reports Location of headquarters by state for
Delaware and Non-Delaware incorporated firns as at 1994.
Panel A: Industry membership
Non-Delaware Incorporated firms Delaware Incorporated firms
SIC Industry Name
#% # %
Not assigned 2 0.6% 3 0.7%
Mining/Construction 6 1.9% 12 2.8%
Food 9 2.9% 22 5.1%
Textiles/Print/Publish 45 14.4% 40 9.3%
Chemicals 14 4.5% 32 7.4%
Pharmaceuticals 13 4.2% 13 3.0%
Extractive 7 2.2% 29 6.7%
Manf:Rubber/glass/etc 12 3.8% 7 1.6%
Manf:Metal 22 7.0% 21 4.9%
Manf:Machinery 16 5.1% 17 3.9%
Manf:ElectricalEqpt 13 4.2% 18 4.2%
Manf:TransportEqpt 16 5.1% 23 5.3%
Manf:Instruments 16 5.1% 23 5.3%
Manf:Misc. 4 1.3% 3 0.7%
Computers 19 6.1% 62 14.4%
Transportation 27 8.6% 26 6.0%
Retail: Wholesale 20 6.4% 12 2.8%
Retail:Misc. 28 8.9% 30 7.0%
Retail:Restaurant 6 1.9% 4 0.9%
Services 18 5.8% 34 7.9%
Total 313 100% 431 100%
Panel B: State of location for Delaware and non-Delaware incorporated firms.
Non-Delaware Incorporated firms Delaware Incorporated firms
State of location # % # %
Alabama AL 2 0.6% 3 0.7%
Alaska AK 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Arizona AZ 2 0.6% 2 0.5%
Arkansas AR 2 0.6% 4 0.9%
California CA 21 6.7% 80 18.6%
Colorado CO 2 0.6% 9 2.1%
Connecticut CT 8 2.6% 15 3.5%
Delaware DE 0 0.0% 3 0.7%
District of Columbia DC 0 0.0% 3 0.7%
Florida FL 8 2.6% 5 1.2%
Georgia GA 13 4.2% 9 2.1%
Hawaii HI 1 0.3% 0 0.0%
Idaho ID 1 0.3% 4 0.9%
Illinois IL 12 3.8% 40 9.3%
Indiana IN 5 1.6% 2 0.5%
Iowa IA 4 1.3% 2 0.5%
Kansas KS 0 0.0% 2 0.5%
Kentucky KY 2 0.6% 3 0.7%
Louisiana LA 2 0.6% 2 0.5%
Maine ME 1 0.3% 0 0.0%
Maryland MD 2 0.6% 4 0.9%
Massachusetts MA 16 5.1% 21 4.9%
Michigan MI 13 4.2% 10 2.3%
Minnesota MN 13 4.2% 15 3.5%
Mississippi MS 0 0.0% 1 0.2%
Missouri MO 8 2.6% 10 2.3%
Montana MT 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Nebraska NE 2 0.6% 2 0.5%
Nevada NV 4 1.3% 0 0.0%
New Hampshire NH 0 0.0% 2 0.5%
New Jersey NJ 10 3.2% 13 3.0%
New Mexico NM 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
New York NY 25 8.0% 35 8.1%
North Carolina NC 10 3.2% 9 2.1%
North Dakota ND 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Ohio OH 35 11.2% 14 3.2%
Oklahoma OK 0 0.0% 3 0.7%
Oregon OR 6 1.9% 2 0.5%
Pennsylvania PA 21 6.7% 20 4.6%
Rhode Island RI 4 1.3% 1 0.2%
South Carolina SC 6 1.9% 1 0.2%
South Dakota SD 0 0.0% 1 0.2%
Tennessee TN 7 2.2% 6 1.4%
Texas TX 21 6.7% 51 11.8%
Utah UT 1 0.3% 2 0.5%
Vermont VT 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Virginia VA 7 2.2% 7 1.6%
Washington WA 5 1.6% 5 1.2%
West Virginia WV 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Wisconsin WI 10 3.2% 6 1.4%
Wyoming WY 1 0.3% 2 0.5%
Totals 313 100.0% 431 100.0%
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for Delaware and Non-Delaware incorporated firms as at 1994. The t-test tests for differences between the means for
Delaware and non-Delaware firms. The difference-in-means t-tests assume unequal variances between groups when a test of equal variance is
rejected at the 10% level. * * and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level or better, respectively.
Non-Delaware Incorporated firms Delaware Incorporated firms
N Mean Med. S.D. N Mean Med. S.D. t-test
Market Cap ($m) 313 2021.97 1115.63 2520.72 430 2436.67 1122.62 3314.77
Total Assets ($m) 313 2351.30 1074.70 3291.21 430 2987.94 1184.20 5254.67 **
Sales ($m) 313 2697.28 1228.22 3387.17 430 2977.55 1373.12 4409.19
Book to Market 313 0.528 0.47 0.27 430 0.524 0.47 0.31
Return on Assets 313 5.843 5.99 5.72 430 4.762 4.98 7.34 *
Leverage 313 1.470 1.19 1.17 430 1.863 1.33 2.19
Analyst Following 313 10.590 10.00 8.06 430 11.283 9.92 8.94
Institutional Holding % 313 0.466 0.52 0.25 430 0.480 0.54 0.25
CEO Stockholding % 313 0.031 0.00 0.07 430 0.026 0.00 0.06
G-Index 313 9.740 10.00 2.80 430 9.306 9.00 2.93 **
Firm Age 313 29.294 31.00 11.63 430 25.844 27.00 13.91
CScore 313 0.018 0.01 0.08 430 0.017 0.01 0.08
BScore 313 0.062 0.05 0.08 430 0.058 0.06 0.08
Investment 290 7.012 6.090 4.833 398 7.266 6.224 5.100 **
Asset Disposals 182 0.437 0.078 1.208 257 0.566 0.114 1.258
ROE 290 0.118 0.13 0.14 398 0.099 0.12 0.22
Inventory 290 -0.070 0.00 2.76 398 -0.058 0.00 2.90
Dividends 290 0.021 0.02 0.02 398 0.014 0.01 0.02
Cash 290 -0.007 0.00 0.05 398 -0.002 0.00 0.06
Lag Return 290 0.204 0.16 0.36 398 0.240 0.14 0.45
Table 4. Correlation Tables
Correlation tables for independent variables used in multivariate tests. Panel A includes variables used to test H1, and Panel B includes variables used to test H2a
and H2b. Spearman correlations reported above the diagonal and Pearson correlations below the diagonal. All variables defined in Appendix A.
Panel A - Variables for tests of Hi
ROA CScore BScore Firm Size Book to F iAnalyst Inst'l CEO Stock G-Index Firm Age
____________________Market Leeae Following Holding % holding %
1 -0.377 -0.388 0.282 -0.376 -0.327 0.181 0.131 0.110 -0.027 -0.018ROA_____
0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.004 0.024
-0.297 1 0.949 -0.842 0.572 0.104 -0.473 -0.197 0.236 -0.123 -0.217CScore
<.0001 0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.284 0.935 1 -0.821 0.603 0.097 -0.453 -0.218 0.207 -0.095 -0.200BScore 
________
<.0001 <.0001 0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.305 -0.823 -0.767 1 -0.398 0.138 0.569 0.273 -0.331 0.132 0.363Firm Size
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Book to -0.152 0.577 0.558 -0.373 1 0.171 -0.169 -0.006 0.025 0.022 0.114
Market <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0 <.0001 <.0001 0.428 0.014 0.019 <.0001
-0.016 0.067 0.071 -0.003 0.001 1 0.043 0.017 -0.187 0.179 0.310
0.046 <.0001 <.0001 0.711 0.878 0 <.0001 0.033 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Analyst 0.174 -0.500 -0.449 0.641 -0.174 0.003 1 0.608 -0.186 0.096 0.181
Following <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.662 0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Inst'l 0.168 -0.184 -0.194 0.243 -0.036 0.006 0.449 1 -0.078 0.112 0.169
Holding % <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.467 <.0001 0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
CEO Stock 0.100 0.115 0.101 -0.156 0.008 -0.017 -0.127 -0.094 1 -0.188 -0.289
holding % <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.434 0.100 <.0001 <.0001 0 <.0001 <.0001
0.001 -0.116 -0.089 0.113 -0.011 0.009 0.099 0.092 -0.219 1 0.358G-Index
0.929 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.221 0.350 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0 <.0001
0.069 -0.210 -0.181 0.379 0.069 0.012 0.231 0.153 -0.186 0.352 1
FirmAge_ <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.117 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0
PANEL B - Variables for tests of H2a and H2b
As nvestmentk t Lagged Analyst Inst'l CEO
as Investment CScore BScore ROE Inventory Firm Bookt Dividends Cash ReHurn Fo olding Holding G-Index
1 0.255 -0.112 -0.111 0.035 0.011 -0.116 -0.110 -0.033 -0.126 0.111 0.114 0.013 0.030 -0.042
Asset Sale 0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.170 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.104 0.004 <.0001
0.255 1 0.078 0.069 -0.036 0.003 0.048 0.068 -0.044 0.033 -0.067 -0.018 -0.026 0.015 0.000Investment
<.0001 0 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 0.738 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 0.056 0.005 0.198 0.999
CScore -0.112 0.078 1 0.935 -0.293 -0.009 -0.210 0.577 -0.312 0.002 -0.204 -0.500 -0.184 0.115 -0.116
<.0001 <.0001 0 <.0001 <.0001 0.306 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.821 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.111 0.069 0.935 1 -0.293 -0.002 -0.181 0.558 -0.278 0.004 -0.198 -0.449 -0.194 0.101 -0.089BScore
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 1 <.0001 0.860 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.660 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.035 -0.036 -0.293 -0.293 1 -0.006 0.104 -0.204 0.220 0.031 0.131 0.134 0.117 0.024 0.033ROE
<.0001 0.000 <.0001 <.0001 0 0.467 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.016 0.001
0.011 0.003 -0.009 -0.002 -0.006 1 -0.002 0.017 0.007 -0.348 -0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.011
0.170 0.738 0.306 0.860 0.467 0 0.802 0.032 0.356 <.0001 0.437 0.666 0.966 0.778 0.235
-0.116 0.048 -0.210 -0.181 0.104 -0.002 1 0.069 0.368 0.030 -0.111 0.231 0.153 -0.186 0.352Firm Age
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.802 0 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Book to -0.110 0.068 0.577 0.558 -0.204 0.017 0.069 1 -0.160 -0.004 -0.232 -0.174 -0.036 0.008 -0.011
Market <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.032 <.0001 0 <.0001 0.575 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.434 0.221
-0.033 -0.044 -0.312 -0.278 0.220 0.007 0.368 -0.160 1 -0.010 -0.049 0.212 0.034 -0.055 0.122Dividends
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.356 <.0001 <.0001 0 0.200 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.126 0.033 0.002 0.004 0.031 -0.348 0.030 -0.004 -0.010 1 -0.019 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.013Cash
<.0001 0.000 0.821 0.660 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 0.575 0.200 0 0.016 0.929 0.753 0.953 0.178
Lagged 0.111 -0.067 -0.204 -0.198 0.131 -0.006 -0.111 -0.232 -0.049 -0.019 1 0.030 0.034 0.033 -0.033
Return <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.437 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.016 0 0.000 <.0001 0.001 0.001
Analyst 0.114 -0.018 -0.500 -0.449 0.134 -0.003 0.231 -0.174 0.212 -0.001 0.030 1 0.449 -0.127 0.099
Following <.0001 0.056 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.666 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.929 0.000 0 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Inst'l 0.013 -0.026 -0.184 -0.194 0.117 0.000 0.153 -0.036 0.034 0.003 0.034 0.449 1 -0.094 0.092
Holding % 0.104 0.005 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.966 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.753 <.0001 <.0001 0 <.0001 <.0001
CEO 0.030 0.015 0.115 0.101 0.024 0.003 -0.186 0.008 -0.055 0.001 0.033 -0.127 -0.094 1 -0.219
Holding % 0.004 0.198 <.0001 <.0001 0.016 0.778 <.0001 0.434 <.0001 0.953 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 0 <.0001
-0.042 0.000 -0.116 -0.089 0.033 -0.011 0.352 -0.011 0.122 0.013 -0.033 0.099 0.092 -0.219 1
G-Index. <. 03 0 20 0.. <.001 <.00 0
______<.000 1 0.999 <.0001 <.000 1 0.001 0.235 <.0001 0.221 <.0001 0.178 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0
Table 5: The effect of Financial Reporting Quality on ROA
This table reports regressions of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on Return on Assets (ROA) around the mid- 1990s
Delaware takeover regime shift. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and
year. t-stats are reported in italics. All tests include firm and year fixed effects. Values in bold indicate significance at
the 10% level or better.
MAIN EFFECT
DE Non-
firms DEfirms
-1.67 -0.80
-3.14 -1.74
Dependent
variable: ROA
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst
Following
Inst'l Holding %
CEO Holding %
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
Adjusted R2
Pred
Sign
2.08
6.43
-1.83
-1.74
0.00
-3.10
-0.10
-2.76
6.03
6.19
14.99
3.70
-0.09
-1.15
-0.02
-1.21
-9.93
-3.01
3967
0.14
1.20
3.90
-4.96
-4.50
-0.01
-1.73
-0.07
-1.65
3.00
3.29
15.00
4.09
-0.05
-0.40
-0.01
-0.57
-0.37
-0.12
2912
0.18
6879
0.16 0.19 0.27
FRQ = CSCORE
DE Non-
firms DEfirms
-1.39 -0.51
-2.89 -1.13
-10.51 -5.40
-3.02 -0.72
11.38 0.17
2.20 0.03
1.59 0.43
4.43 1.01
-2.91 -5.75
-3.78 -5.22
-0.84 -1.33
-5.12 -4.92
-0.12 -0.04
-3.36 -1.02
4.66 1.41
4.12 1.77
13.08 10.07
3.69 3.38
-0.02 -0.05
-0.36 -0.74
0.01 0.04
0.43 2.39
-4.51 6.92
-1.30 6.92
3967 2912 6879
0.22
Dependent
variable: ROA
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst
Following
Inst'l Holding %
CEO Holding %
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
Adjusted RI
Pred
Sign
FRQ = GSCORE
DE Non-
firms DEfirms
-2.43
-2.89
-34.32
+
-5.54
18.37
+
1.99
1.78
+/-
6.15
-3.00
-3.68
-0.90
-5.13
-0.11
-3.38
4.67
+
4.15
12.78
+
3.55
-0.03
-0.38
0.01
+
0.47
-4.26
+/-
-1.43
3967
0.19
-1.39
-1.25
-24.30
-1.99
6.28
0.38
0.74
3.05
-5.96
-5.56
-1.41
-5.76
-0.05
-1.17
1.45
1.89
10.04
3.33
-0.04
-0.60
0.04
2.39
6.00
2.62
2912
0.25
6879
0.22
FRQ = BSCORE
DE Non-
firms DEfirms
-2.04 -0.53
-4.45 -1.05
-17.03 -7.76
-5.11 -1.30
11.18 -2.19
2.59 -0.61
1.38 0.31
4.05 0.85
-2.48 -5.58
-3.43 -5.12
-0.82 -1.31
-5.18 -5.15
-0.12 -0.04
-3.39 -1.02
4.62 1.38
4.11 1.75
12.96 10.16
3.71 3.50
-0.02 -0.05
-0.29 -0.73
0.01 0.04
0.41 2.45
-2.21 8.13
-0.66 2.70
3967 2912
0.19 0.27
6879
0.22
Table 6: The effect of Financial Reporting Quality on Capital Investment
This table reports regressions of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on Capital Investment around the mid- 1990s Delaware
takeover regime shift. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-stats are
reported in italics. All tests include firm and year fixed effects. Values in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or
better.
MAIN EFFECT
D EE
firms firms
-0.01 -0.23
-0.03 -0.77
Dependent variable:
Disposals
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
ROE
Inventory
Firm Age
Book to Market
Dividends
Cash
G-Index
Lag Return
Analyst Following
Inst'l Holding %
CEO Holding %
Intercept
N
Adjusted R2
Pred
Sign
-0.75
+/-
-1.80
-0.06
+
-1.04
-0.03
-2.76
-0.38
-1.17
-12.60
+
-1.62
-11.10
+
-5.26
0.90
3.21
0.11
+
5.63
-0.96
+/-
-1.69
-3.74
+/-
-1.49
-0.01
+/-
-0.15
8.00
11.73
3895
0.06
0.20
0.45
-0.02
-0.48
-0.03
-2.28
-0.77
-2.78
-9.14
-0.94
-7.60
-4.51
0.64
2.20
0.06
2.89
-1.14
-1.55
1.50
0.53
-0.11
-1.52
9.25
9.12
2820
0.05
6715
0.06
FRQ = CSCORE
D E Nn-
firms firm
0.06 -0.13
0.17 -0.44
-0.59 1.04
-0.21 0.41
4.34 -2.29
2.02 -1.33
-0.18 0.65
-0.31 1.25
-0.07 0.01
-1.27 0.37
-0.03 -0.04
-2.27 -2.09
-0.13 -0.67
-0.29 -2.16
-15.15 -14.87
-1.65 -1.45
-11.35 -6.20
-5.40 -6.20
1.21 0.59
5.00 1.70
0.14 0.06
5.80 2.37
-1.23 -1.23
-2.15 -0.01
-2.62 3.73
-1.03 0.04
-0.04 -0.12
-0.60 0.00
7.60 9.55
10.17 0.10
3895 2820
0.07 0.06
6715
0.07
FRQ = BSCORE
Dependent variable:
Investment
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
ROE
Inventory
Firm Age
Book to Market
Dividends
Cash
G-Index
Lag Return
Analyst Following
Inst'l Holding %
CEO Holding %
Intercept
N
Adjusted Rz
Pred
Sign
DE
firms
-0.14
-0.24
-2.81
-0.34
9.46
0.76
-0.23
-0.39
-0.07
+
-1.36
-0.03
-2.59
0.10
0.28
-14.83
-1.60
-11.40
-5.50
1.14
5.04
0.13
5.96
-1.13
-1.91
-2.53
-0.98
-0.04
-0.64
7.76
9.77
3895
0.07
DE
firms
Non-
DE
firms
-0.17
-0.30
2.69
0.33
0.81
0.09
0.68
1.31
0.01
0.36
-0.04
-2.14
-0.70
-2.37
-15.21
-1.48
-6.28
-6.06
0.58
1.64
0.06
2.56
-1.22
-1.62
3.69
1.07
-0.12
-1.52
9.46
7.74
2820
0.06
-0.16
-0.41
-0.82
-0.29
5.86
222
-0.15
-0.24
-0.07
-1.30
-0.03
-2.25
-0.16
-0.37
-15.00
-1.64
-11.40
-5.56
1.20
4.75
0.14
5.92
-1.26
-2.18
-2.64
-1.03
-0.04
-0.61
7.65
9.78
3895
0.07
FRQ = GSCORE
Non-
DE
firms
-0.10
-0.31
0.74
0.36
-1.48
-0.92
0.66
1.29
0.01
0.37
-0.04
-2.09
-0.70
-2.38
-15.01
-1.45
-6.19
-6.22
0.59
1.72
0.06
2.46
-1.23
-1.64
3.71
1.08
-0.12
-1.50
9.52
8.20
2820
0.06
6715
0.07
6715
0.07
0.07
Table 7: The effect of Financial Reporting Quality on Asset Sales
This table reports regressions of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on Asset Sales around the mid-1990s Delaware
takeover regime shift. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-stats are
reported in italics. All tests include firm and year fixed effects. Values in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or
better.
MAIN EFFECT
D E Non-
firms DEfirms
0.05 0.19
0.84 3.91
Dependent variable: Pred
Disposals Sign
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
ROE
Inventory
Firm Age
Book to Market
Dividends
Cash
G-Index
Lag Return
Analyst Following
Inst'l Holding %
CEO Holding %
Intercept
N
Adjusted Rz
-0.09
-0.50
0.02
+
2.70
0.01
2.13
0.18
219
-5.89
-280
1.72
3.87
-0.16
-2.11
0.00
-0.90
-0.14
-0.88
-0.33
-0.71
0.02
1.24
0.38
2.09
2696
0.03
0.55
2.37
0.00
1.03
0.01
1.45
0.16
1.23
-6.68
-2.09
0.49
1.28
-0.22
-1.63
0.00
0.71
-0.04
-0.18
0.99
0.94
-0.047
-1.69
0.66
1.78
2001
0.03
4697
0.03
DE
firms
0.01
0.09
1.42
1.61
1.07
1.56
-0.17
-0.90
0.02
2.00
0.01
1.91
0.09
0.68
-6.53
-2.36
1.58
4.47
-0.04
-0.56
0.00
0.64
-0.12
-0.67
-0.30
-0.63
0.03
1.46
0.22
1.30
2696
0.03
FRQ = CSCORE
Non-
DE
firms
0.13
2.54
1.44
1.95
1.23
1.74
0.45
2.46
0.01
0.76
0.01
1.23
0.06
0.62
-5.75
-1.92
0.73
1.40
-0.09
-0.64
0.02
2.12
-0.06
0.00
1.74
0.02
-0.04
0.00
0.45
0.00
2001
0.04
4697
0.04
Dependent variable: Sign
Disposals
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
ROE
Inventory
Firm Age
Book to Market
Dividends
Cash
G-Index
Lag Return
Analyst Following
Inst'l Holding %
CEO Holding %
Intercept
N
Adjusted R2
FRQ = GSCORE
DE Non-
firms D Efirms
0.05 0.27
0.58 5.29
-1.14 0.14
-2.50 0.38
-1.60 -2.72
-0.96 -2.35
-0.25 0.36
-1.27 2.12
0.02 0.00
1.98 0.65
0.01 0.01
1.60 0.96
0.25 0.24
1.95 2.58
-7.03 -5.75
-2.48 -1.90
1.66 0.81
4.50 1.68
-0.07 -0.12
-1.00 -0.90
0.00 0.01
-0.52 1.49
-0.06 -0.02
-0.30 -0.11
-0.25 1.76
-0.51 1.18
0.03 -0.04
1.53 -1.36
0.33 0.54
2.16 1.33
2696 2001
0.03 0.04
FRQ = BSCORE
DE Non-DE DE
firms D Efirms
0.01
0.18
1.08
1.17
0.93
1.12
-0.18
-0.92
0.02
1.96
0.01
1.83
0.13
0.96
-6.38
-2.31
1.56
4.46
-0.06
-0.74
0.00
0.34
-0.11
-0.56
-0.27
-0.56
0.03
1.45
0.19
1.03
2696
0.03
4697
0.03
0.15
3.50
1.12
1.93
1.07
1.38
0.45
2.40
0.01
0.77
0.01
1.12
0.12
1.41
-5.63
-1.90
0.70
1.36
-0.10
-0.76
0.014
2.01
-0.05
-0.23
1.73
1.16
-0.04
-1.36
0.41
1.01
2001
0.04
4697
0.03
Table 8: Industry competition - subsample analysis
This table examines the effect of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on ROA around the mid- 1990s Delaware
takeover regime shift, with sample firms partitioned by industry competition. Panel A presents results for FRQ set
as CScore and Panel B presents results for FRQ set as BScore. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard
errors are clustered by firm and year. t-stats are reported in italics. Values in bold indicate significance at the 10%
level or better. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects.
Panel A: FRQ = Cscore
Dependent
variable: Invest
HIGH COMPETITION
Pred DE Non-
Si gn firms D Efirms
--
2.11 -0.76
-2.87 -1.08
-17.34 0.10
-3.52 0.01
9.91 2.53
1.14 0.39
1.91 0.70
2.62 0.91
-2.02 -6.09
-1.36 -3.40
-0.54 -1.74
-3.36 -4.24
-0.16 0.00
-2.87 0.03
5.19 1.20
2.89 0.92
16.71 11.47
2.88 1.95
0.00 -0.05
0.04 -0.34
0.00 0.07
0.07 2.53
-7.51 4.03
-1.09 0.69
2089 1596 36
0.16 0.22 0.18 0.26 0.36 0.29
LOW COMPETITION
DE Non-
firms D Efirms-
-0.88 -0.44
-1.68 -1.02
-0.63 -11.39
-0.13 -2.29
10.86 0.88
2.34 0.17
1.56 0.15
4.59 0.55
-3.77 -5.68
-5.42 -6.32
-1.37 -1.02
-7.21 -5.14
-0.09 -0.09
-2.28 -1.93
4.20 1.42
3.91 1.74
9.29 9.79
2.46 2.95
-0.06 -0.07
-0.88 -0.85
0.01 0.00
0.42 0.09
-2.90 10.17
-1.09 10.17
2089 1596 3685
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst
Following
Inst'l Holding
CEO Holding
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
Adjusted R2
85
0.16 0.22 0.18 0.26 0.36 0.29
Panel B: FRQ = Bscore
HIGH COMPETITION
Dependent
variable: Invest
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst
Following
Inst'l Holding
CEO Holding
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
Adjusted R2
Pred DE Non-
Sign firms DEfirms
-3.02 -0.82
-4.00 -1.07
-21.18 -5.20
-4.36 -0.49
12.43 1.67
1.60 0.28
1.89 0.49
2.68 0.68
-1.73 -5.81
-1.19 -3.43
-0.54 -1.72
-3.53 -4.58
-0.16 0.00
-2.95 0.03
5.14 1.14
2.90 0.87
16.61 11.33
2.86 1.92
0.01 -0.04
0.12 -0.33
0.00 0.08
0.04 2.57
-6.33 5.78
-0.94 0.96
2089 1596
0.16 0.22
DE
firms
-1.25
-2.29
-10.69
-2.76
9.82
2.74
1.16
3.81
-3.17
-4.73
-1.29
-7.43
-0.08
-2.17
4.13
3.78
9.40
2.55
-0.06
-0.90
0.01
0.45
0.36
0.14
2089
0.26
3685
0.19
LOW COMPETITION
Non-
DE
firms
-0.52
-1.03
-12.00
-2.96
-2.47
-0.91
0.08
0.30
-5.61
-6.16
-1.00
-5.38
-0.08
-1.85
1.36
1.69
9.96
3.10
-0.07
-0.83
0.00
0.16
11.23
5.47
1596 36
0.36 0.
85
3030
Table 9: Takeover Defenses - Effect of Financial Reporting
Quality on ROA
This table examines the effect of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on ROA around the mid-
1990s Delaware takeover regime shift, with sample firms partitioned by the level of takeover
defenses. The sample is restricted to firms incorporated in Delaware. All variables are defined
in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-stats are reported in italics.
Values in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or better. All regressions include firm
and year fixed effects.
Panel A: High Takeover Defense Firms
FRQ=
CSCORE
FRQ=
BSCORE
Dependent variable: ROA
Pred
Sign DE firms DE firms
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst Following
Inst'l Holding %
CEO Stockholding %
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
-0.94
-1.99
-4.87
-0.92
14.67
2.37
1.09
2.91
-4.45
-7.38
-0.81
-4.91
-0.09
-2.46
2.91
2.93
18.53
3.95
-0.11
-1.43
0.04
2.03
0.16
0.05
1987
-1.46
-3.12
-12.33
-4.25
12.56
2.83
0.79
2.84
-3.85
-6.90
-0.77
-5.00
-0.09
-2.42
2.86
2.84
18.57
4.03
-0.10
-1.37
0.04
2.01
2.76
1.08
1987
Adjusted R2 0.20 020
.2
Panel B: Low Takeover Defense Firms
FRQ=
CSCORE
DE firmsPredSign
FRQ=
BSCORE
DE firms
Dependent variable: ROA
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst Following
Inst'l Holding %
CEO Stockholding %
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
Adjusted R2
-2.12
-2.64
-14.67
-2.93
13.98
1.72
2.12
3.14
-2.69
-2.25
-0.82
-3.28
-0.11
-1.84
5.17
2.77
8.43
1.38
-0.05
-0.30
-0.04
-1.48
-7.34
-1.10
1374
0.238
-3.06
-3.47
-20.52
-3.40
15.81
1.99
2.01
2.99
-2.24
-1.88
-0.80
-3.41
-0.11
-1.92
5.14
2.77
8.17
1.35
-0.05
-0.29
-0.04
-1.46
-5.55
-0.83
1374
0.243
Table 10: Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) setting replication
This table examines the effect of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on Operating Performance (Panel A) and Capital
Investment (Panel B) using the passage of Business Combination laws as used in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). All
variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-stats are reported in italics.
Intercepts are excluded. Values in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or better. All tests include firm and year
fixed effects.
Panel A - Operating Performance
Dependent variable: ROA PredSign Main Effect
FRQ =
CSCORE
FRQ =
GSCORE
FRQ =
BSCORE
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst Following
Institutional Holding %
Firm Age
N
Adjusted R2
-0.50
-2.00
5.13
14.61
0.97
2.78
0.00
-1.22
-0.24
-7.26
1.09
2.74
1.25
1.84
40642
0.667
-0.59
-2.09
0.48
0.65
2.63
2.55
3.24
20.24
-1.29
-6.82
-22.46
-18.60
-0.13
-6.39
-0.79
-2.66
-5.29
-6.44
3.14
2.65
4.96
14.78
1.16
3.19
0.00
-1.19
-0.23
-7.46
1.18
3.08
1.25
1.84
40642
0.668
-0.77
-2.93
4.53
2.36
5.26
1.34
5.13
14.42
0.96
2.72
0.00
-1.14
-0.24
-7.31
1.01
2.55
1.29
1.91
40642
0.614
0.23
0.63
1.45
3.08
40642
0.645
Panel B - Capital Expenditure
Dependent variable: CapEx
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Return on Equity
Inventory
Firm Age
Market to Book
Dividends
Cash Holdings
Lagged Stock Return
Analyst Following
Institutional Holding %
N
Adjusted R2
Pred
Sign Main Effect
FRQ =
GSCORE
0.00
-0.16
FRQ =
BSCORE
FRQ =
CSCORE
0.00
-0.90
-0.03
-5.83
0.01
2.35
0.01
9.10
0.00
-17.20
0.00
-0.99
-0.01
-13.26
0.14
2.35
-0.16
-28.96
0.01
12.79
0.00
1.18
0.01
6.42
28378
0.59
0.00
0.34
0.00
0.30
-0.02
-1.01
0.01
9.93
0.00
-16.74
0.00
-0.93
-0.02
-14.87
0.15
2.64
-0.16
-28.89
0.01
12.84
0.00
1.39
0.01
6.28
28378
0.501
0.01
9.87
0.00
-16.84
0.00
-0.94
-0.02
-14.88
0.15
2.65
-0.16
-29.00
0.01
12.90
0.00
1.37
0.01
6.18
28378
0.59
0.00
-1.00
-0.03
-6.26
0.01
1.84
0.01
9.19
0.00
-17.17
0.00
-1.01
-0.01
-12.82
0.14
2.31
-0.16
-28.88
0.01
12.79
0.00
1.05
0.01
6.51
28378
0.50
Table 11: Managerial Entrenchment - subsample analysis
This table examines the effect of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on ROA around the mid-1990s Delaware
takeover regime shift, with sample firms partitioned using the Entrenchment index (E-Index) from Bebchuk and
Cohen (2005). Panel A displays tests where FRQ = CScore, and Panel B displays tests where FRQ = BScore. All
variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-stats are reported in italics.
Values in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or better. All tests include firm and year fixed effects.
PanelA: FRQ = CScore
Dependent
variable: ROA
Pred
Sign
LOW ENTRENCHMENT
DE Non-
firms DEfirms
-1.64 0.01
HIGH ENTRENCHMENT
DE Non-
frms DEfirms
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst
Following
Inst'l Holding
CEO Holding
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
Adjusted R2
-2.88
-9.57
-2.72
16.56
2.40
1.54
3.29
-3.99
-4.60
-0.75
-3.99
-0.09
-2.41
4.39
3.24
11.46
2.41
-0.07
-0.71
0.01
0.52
-3.58
-0.76
1352
0.19
0.02
-0.68
-0.08
1.87
0.26
0.18
0.35
-6.73
-6.43
-1.55
-5.30
-0.02
-0.80
1.25
1.54
7.13
2.07
-0.10
-1.29
0.02
1.22
10.09
2.68
1104
0.31
-0.78
-1.32
-9.12
-1.56
0.03
0.00
1.83
3.70
-1.21
-1.12
-1.10
-8.50
-0.16
-2.66
5.21
3.39
15.43
3.18
-0.01
-0.09
0.01
0.64
-6.58
-1.85
1352
0.20
-1.29
-2.53
-14.41
-1.72
4.95
0.89
1.08
1.88
-4.13
-2.92
-0.91
-2.75
-0.09
-1.16
1.08
0.82
16.98
3.74
0.08
0.59
0.03
1.25
0.84
0.84
1104
0.25
2456
0.23
2456
0.22
Panel B: FRQ = BScore
Dependent
variable: ROA
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst
Following
Inst'l Holding
CEO Holding
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
Adjusted RI
LOW ENTRENCHMENT
Pred DE Non-
Sign firms DEfirms
-2.40 0.21
-4.21 0.36
-17.09 -3.29
-4.68 -0.47
15.63 -2.56
2.69 -0.44
1.27 -0.02
2.85 -0.05
-3.39 -6.49
-3.97 -5.95
-0.72 -1.51
-3.96 -5.39
-0.09 -0.02
-2.42 -0.73
4.34 1.21
3.18 1.50
11.33 7.33
2.42 2.19
-0.07 -0.10
-0.66 -1.30
0.01 0.03
0.52 1.29
-1.00 11.51
-0.22 3.31
1352 1104 245(
0.19 0.31 0.23
HIGH ENTRENCHMENT
DE Non-
firms DEfirms
-1.15 -1.95
-1.98 -3.34
-13.76 -20.02
-2.99 -3.05
0.67 5.45
0.14 1.26
1.72 0.94
3.64 1.71
-1.04 -3.96
-1.02 -3.14
-1.08 -0.91
-8.52 -2.82
-0.17 -0.09
-2.76 -1.25
5.21 1.05
3.42 0.81
15.40 16.98
3.14 3.72
0.00 0.09
0.00 0.67
0.01 0.03
0.64 1.26
-5.11 2.91
-1.42 0.64
1352 1104 2456
0.20 0.26 0.22
Table 12: Post-Regime Shift role of Governance Mechanisms
This table examines the effect of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on ROA around the mid-1990s Delaware takeover
regime shift, and includes control variables to allow the role of governance and information environment variables to vary
in the post regime shift period. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-
stats are reported in italics. Values in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or better. All regressions include firm and
year fixed effects.
Dependent variable:
ROA
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst Following
Inst'l Holding %
CEO Holding %
G-Index
Firm Age
AFT*Analyst
Following
AFT*Inst Holding %
AFT*CEO Holding %
AFT*G-Index
Intercept
N
Adjusted R2
Pred
Sign
DE
firms
-4.241
-2.89
-10.33
-2.95
11.82
206
+/- 1.60
4.35
-2.93
-3.86
-0.85
-5.27
-0.12
-3.37
4.63
3.12
7.59
1.75
-0.17
-2.10
0.00
0.36
0.01
+ 00
0.30
-0.07
-0.05
9.99
231
0.27
3.14
-2.90
-0.79
3967
0.19
DE
firms
FRQ = CSCORE
Non-
DE
firms
-1.731
-1.46
-5.03
-0.66
-0.98
-0.13
0.46
1.06
-5.68
-5.23
-1.33
-4.94
-0.03
-0.66
1.64
1.65
9.49
2.45
-0.15
-1.86
0.03
2.19
-0.04
-0.66
-0.44
-0.39
0.67
0.19
0.19
1.98
7.48
2.44
2912
0.27
-4.60
-3.10
-15.68
-5.63
12.56
2.48
1.48
4.14
-2.61
-3.77
-0.85
-5.36
-0.12
-3.51
4.55
3.02
7.36
1.75
-0.16
-1.95
0.01
0.36
0.01
0.30
0.01
0.01
10.17
2.36
0.27
3.00
-1.26
-0.35
3967
0.19
FRQ = BSCORE
Non-
DE
firms
-2.01
-1.74
-8.45
-1.49
-0.36
-0.06
0.37
0.97
-5.54
-5.29
-1.31
-5.06
-0.03
-0.72
1.65
1.69
9.54
2.58
-0.15
-1.89
0.03
2.25
-0.04
-0.65
-0.48
-0.44
0.64
0.18
0.20
2.05
8.57
8.57
2912
0.27
6879
0.22
6879
0.220.220.22
Table 13: Exclusion of firms without recourse to a Poison Pill
This table examines the effect of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on ROA around the mid-1990s Delaware takeover
regime shift after excluding firms without poison pills in place as at 1995. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-stats are reported in italics. Values in bold indicate significance at the 10%
level or better. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects.
Dependent variable:
ROA
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst Following
Inst'l Holding %
CEO Holding %
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
Adjusted R2
Pred
Sign
DE
firms
-1.57
-3.05
-9.59
-2.24
11.23
1.95
2.16
5.82
-2.18
-2.40
-1.09
-6.57
-0.18
-5.10
6.23
4.52
17.95
3.62
-0.02
-0.27
-0.01
-0.49
-8.47
-2.32
2657
0.21
FRQ = CSCORE
Non-
DE
firms
-0.88
-2.15
-3.87
-0.44
1.26
0.25
0.83
1.84
-5.12
-4.31
-1.33
-4.02
-0.06
-1.17
1.51
1.51
16.20
4.06
-0.04
-0.36
0.05
2.33
3.35
0.98
2006
0.25
4663
0.23 0.21 0.25
FRQ = BSCORE
D E Non-
firms DEfirms
-2.22 -0.90
-4.46 -1.85
-15.94 -5.63
-2.97 -0.79
11.15 -0.90
2.14 -0.23
1.94 0.73
5.29 1.85
-1.83 -5.00
-2.10 -4.36
-1.06 -1.30
-6.59 -4.06
-0.18 -0.06
-5.07 -1.17
6.19 1.49
4.54 1.50
17.77 16.19
3.60 4.05
-0.01 -0.04
-0.20 -0.37
-0.01 0.05
-0.52 2.32
-6.14 4.38
-1.70 4.38
2657 2006 4663
0.23
Table 14: Charter-Based Staggered Board Firms
This table examines the effect of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on ROA around the mid-1990s Delaware
takeover regime shift, after removing Bylaws-based Staggered Board firms from the sample. All variables are
defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-stats are reported in italics. Values in bold
indicate significance at the 10% level or better. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects.
FRQ = CSCORE
DE Non-
firms DEfirms
-1.40 -0.49 1
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst
Following
Inst'l Holding
CEO Holding %
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
Adjusted R2 0.18
-1.09
-5.35
-0.72
0.02
0.00
0.43
1.00
-5.74
-5.22
-1.33
-4.90
-0.04
-1.03
1.39
1.75
10.09
3.37
-0.05
-0.73
0.04
2.39
6.92
2.13
2892
0.27
-2.89
-10.53
+
-3.02
11.46
+
2.21
1.60
+/-
4.46
-2.91
-3.77
-0.84
-5.12
-0.12
-3.39
4.68
4.14
13.10
+
3.69
-0.02
-0.33
0.01
+
0.40
-4.59
+/-
-1.33
3952
Pred
Sign
0.19 0.27
Dependent
variable: ROA
FRQ = BSCORE
DE Non-
firms DEfirms
-2.05 -0.51
-4.46 -1.00
-17.03 -7.70
-5.11 -1.29
11.25 -2.35
2.60 -0.65
1.39 0.31
4.08 0.84
-2.47 -5.57
-3.42 -5.11
-0.82 -1.31
-5.17 -5.13
-0.12 -0.04
-3.42 -1.03
4.63 1.36
4.13 1.73
12.99 10.18
3.71 3.50
-0.02 -0.05
-0.26 -0.72
0.01 0.04
0.39 2.45
-2.29 8.13
-0.69 8.13
3952 28926844
0.21
6844
0.22
Table 15: Alternative compensation proxy in tests of ROA
This table examines the effect of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on ROA around the mid-1990s Delaware
takeover regime shift, using an alternative proxy for CEO Holding % that incorporates both CEO stock and CEO
option holdings. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. t-stats
are reported in italics. Values in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or better. All regressions include firm
and year fixed effects.
Dependent
variable: ROA
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to
Market
Leverage
Analyst
Following
Inst'l Holding
CEO Holding
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
Adjusted R2 0.26
FRQ = BSCORE
DE Non-
Dirms DEfirms
FRQ = CSCORE
Pred DE Non-
Sign firms DEfirms
-1.47 -0.60
-3.01 -1.30
-10.44 -5.41
+
-2.99 -0.72
11.38 0.40
+
2.22 0.08
1.63 0.48
+/-
4.53 1.10
-2.87 -5.70
-3.72 -5.15
-0.84 -1.33
-4.98 -4.92
-0.11 -0.05
-3.31 -1.10
4.69 1.39
4.08 1.77
14.54 9.73
4.31 3.37
-0.02 -0.06
-0.29 -0.81
0.01 0.04
+
0.50 2.48
-5.05 6.59
+/-
-1.44 2.00
3955 2880 6835
0.21 0.19
-2.12
-4.53
-16.79
-4.99
11.24
2.62
1.42
4.13
-2.45
-3.38
-0.82
-5.03
-0.11
-3.35
4.65
4.06
14.37
4.31
-0.02
-0.22
0.01
0.49
-2.80
-0.82
3955
-0.63
-1.22
-7.70
-1.29
-1.94
-0.54
0.36
0.96
-5.54
-5.05
-1.31
-5.16
-0.04
-1.10
1.36
1.75
9.80
3.48
-0.06
-0.80
0.04
2.54
7.79
7.79
2880
0.270.19
6835
0.22
Table 16: Removal of California Firms
This table examines the effect of Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) on ROA around the mid-i 990s Delaware takeover
regime shift, after excluding firms headquartered in California. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors
are clustered by firm and year. t-stats are reported in italics. Values in bold indicate significance at the 10% level or better.
All regressions include firm and year fixed effects.
Dependent variable:
ROA
AFT
FRQ
AFT*FRQ
Firm Size
Book to Market
Leverage
Analyst Following
Inst'l Holding %
CEO Holding %
G-Index
Firm Age
Intercept
N
Pred
Sign
DE
firms
-1.39
-2.89
-10.51
+
-3.02
11.38
+
2.20
1.59
+/-
4.43
-2.91
-3.78
-0.84
-5.12
-0.12
+
-3.36
4.66
+
4.12
13.08
+
3.69
-0.02
-0.36
0.01
+
0.43
-4.51
+/-
-1.30
3967
Adjusted R2 0.19
FRQ = CSCORE
Non
DE
firms-
-0.39
-0.92
-5.25
-0.71
0.54
0.11
0.41
1.01
-5.68
-5.28
-1.29
-4.84
-0.03
-0.77
1.23
1.48
9.93
3.35
-0.04
-0.68
0.03
2.01
6.96
2.37
2829
0.27
6796
0.22
DE
firms
-2.04
-4.45
-17.03
-5.11
11.18
2.59
1.38
4.05
-2.48
-3.43
-0.82
-5.18
-0.12
-3.39
4.62
4.11
12.96
3.71
-0.02
-0.29
0.01
0.41
-2.21
-0.66
3967
0.19
FRQ = BSCORE
Non-
DE
firmsm
-0.42
-0.85
-7.32
-1.24
-1.69
-0.47
0.30
0.86
-5.52
-5.23
-1.27
-5.05
-0.03
-0.77
1.20
1.46
10.01
3.47
-0.04
-0.67
0.03
2.07
8.07
8.07
2829
0.28
6796
0.22
